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In the summer of 1999, the United States Supreme Court issued the last in a
trilogy of 1990s cases dealing with the question of the admissibility of expert tes-
timony in federal courts.1  In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,2 the Court was
asked to decide if the judicial gatekeeping role it set forth in the first of these
three cases, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,3 applied only to “scien-
tific” knowledge or to all expert testimony.  The court concluded that all expert
testimony must be both relevant and reliable before it can be admitted, but that
the specific factors set forth in Daubert to judge the reliability of scientific evi-
dence may be supplemented and perhaps replaced by other factors when expert
testimony is based on “technical” or “other specialized” knowledge.4  The
opinion explicitly recognized that not all expert testimony can be judged by a
single standard because not all experts know things in exactly the same way.5
This point had been colorfully made five years earlier in the Sixth Circuit’s
opinion in Berry v. City of Detroit.6
In Berry, while wrestling with the admissibility of the expert testimony of a
“sociologist cum sheriff”7 as to whether the disciplinary practices of the Detroit
police department demonstrated a policy of deliberate indifference to the rights
of the citizenry, thus giving rise to municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
the Sixth Circuit made the following comparison between scientific and non-
scientific expert testimony:
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1. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136
(1997); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2. 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999).
3. 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
4. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 lists these three types of expert knowledge.  The rule reads:  “If
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evi-
dence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of opinion or otherwise.”  FED. R. EVID. 702.
5. See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 141-42.
6. 25 F.3d 1342 (6th Cir. 1994).
7. Id. at 1349.
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The distinction between scientific and non-scientific expert testimony is a critical
one.  By way of illustration, if one wanted to explain to a jury how a bumblebee is able
to fly, an aeronautical engineer might be a helpful witness.  Since flight principles have
some universality, the expert could apply general principles to the case of the bumble-
bee.  Conceivably, even if he had never seen a bumblebee, he still would be qualified
to testify, as long as he was familiar with its component parts.
On the other hand, if one wanted to prove that bumblebees always take off into
the wind, a beekeeper with no scientific training at all would be an acceptable expert
witness if a proper foundation were laid for his conclusions.  The foundation would
not relate to his formal training, but to his firsthand observations.  In other words, the
beekeeper does not know any more about flight principles than the jurors, but he has
seen a lot more bumblebees than they have.8 
How do aeronautical engineers and beekeepers know what they know?
How does their knowledge differ and how is it the same?  The insight of the
Berry opinion is that a satisfactory answer to the legal question of admissibility
is in part contingent upon our understanding of the nature of expert knowledge.
But this alone is not enough.  Admissibility standards are also influenced by the
organization of the legal system itself.  In this article, I attempt to shed some
light on different ways experts (and non-experts) know things and then to offer
some thoughts on how this should influence the legal assessment of the admis-
sibility of expert testimony.9
In Part II, I review the legal developments leading up to Kumho.  I give spe-
cial emphasis to the alternative approaches to admissibility reflected in the
Frye10 and Daubert11 tests and to the Kumho decision to sweep non-scientific
evidence under the Daubert umbrella.12
Part III addresses two questions: What is the law’s implicit epistemology
with respect to scientific knowledge, and how does scientific knowledge differ
from other forms of knowing?  I argue that while there may be differences be-
tween intellectual fields along such dimensions as a reliance on individual “ex-
perience” as a basis of judgment, and the ability of fields to isolate themselves
from political, economic, and social pressures, the differences are often as great
within disciplines as between them.  Because differences between fields offer
limited insight into how we come to know things, I turn to a body of psychologi-
cal research that finds that people process information in two fundamentally
different ways, which I call “rational processing” and “experiential process-
ing.”13  I discuss the nature of these two ways of understanding when people and
experts are more likely to use one or the other.
8. Id. at 1349-50.
9. My discussion focuses on witnesses who testify about causal relationships in some form.  It has
relatively little to say about experts who restrict their testimony to factual assertions.  Many non-
scientific experts fall into this category.  See United States v. Angelilli, 660 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1981)
(dealing with auctioneers).
10. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
11. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.
12. See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 141.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 165-196 for definitions of these terms.
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Part IV turns its attention back to the courts.  I argue that the epistemologi-
cal needs of the law argue for admissibility criteria that push witnesses strongly
in the direction of rational processing and offer some general thoughts about
what this means for a variety of admissibility decisions, including the decision
whether to admit the testimony of Berry’s beekeeper.
II
LEGAL STANDARDS OF ADMISSIBILITY
A. Frye
The question of when to trust an expert is as old as expert testimony itself.14
As David Faigman, Elise Porter, and Michael Saks note, the problem presents a
conundrum:
The trial process seeks out expert testimony because the expert, by definition, pos-
sesses knowledge that the judge and jury lack.  With the benefit of the expert’s knowl-
edge, the fact-finder’s uncertainty about facts at issue in a case might be reduced and
decisions reached more easily and accurately.  But precisely because the expert’s
knowledge is beyond the ken of the judge and jury, they are in a weak position to
evaluate whether what an expert is offering is genuine, valid, and helpful.15
The most important pre-Daubert case to deal with this problem is Frye v. United
States.16 The defendant, accused of murder, offered the results of a “systolic
blood pressure deception test,” a precursor to the polygraph, as evidence of his
innocence.17  At the time, this was a novel technique, and there was no commu-
nity of experts using it.18  Judge Van Orsdel found a solution in only two pages.
The key passage established what has come to be called the “general acceptance
14. See David L. Faigman et al., Check Your Crystal Ball at the Courthouse Door, Please: Exploring
the Past, Understanding the Present, and Worrying About the Future of Scientific Evidence, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 1799, 1800 (1994).  This article reports the first clear reference to an expert witness
called by and on behalf of a party, which occurred in the case of Folkes v. Chadd, 99 Eng. Rep. 589
(1782).  For commentary on the history of expert witnesses, see Learned Hand, Historical and Practical
Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1901); Stephan Landsman, Of
Witches, Madmen, and Products Liability: An Historical Survey of the Use of Expert Testimony, 13
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 131 (1995).
15. Faigman et al., supra note 14, at 1801.  Scott Brewer builds on this problem to argue that when
confronted with equally matched contrary expert opinions, the non-expert is incapable of choosing be-
tween them without engaging in epistemic arbitrariness and thereby violating the “norm of intellectual
due process.”  Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE. L.J.
1535, 1680 (1998).  He views Daubert as an unsatisfactory solution to this problem.  See id.
16. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).  My discussion here borrows heavily from 1 DAVID L. FAIGMAN,
ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY Ch. 1 (1997
& Supp. 1999).
17. See Frye, 293 F. at 1013.
18. Prior to Frye, most courts sidestepped the conundrum by asking only about the expert’s qualifi-
cations and whether the subject matter of his testimony was beyond the range of knowledge of the av-
erage juror.  See John B. Chapin, Experts and Expert Testimony, 22 ALB. L.J. 365 (1880); Albert S. Os-
born, Reasons and Reasoning in Expert Testimony, 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 488, 489 (Winter
1935).  If the court applied a qualification test, the testimony of the defendant’s expert probably would
have been admitted.  Frye’s expert, William Marston, was an attorney and research psychologist who
had done empirical research on the physiological correlates of lying.  See William M. Marston, Systolic
Blood Pressure Symptoms of Deception, 2 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 117 (1917).
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test.”19  Expert testimony is admissible when the scientific principle or technique
from which it is deduced has gained general acceptance in the particular field to
which it belongs.20
At the time it was decided, the Frye rule went largely unnoticed.21  Frye’s
emergence as the prominent standard occurred only in the 1970s, probably be-
cause only then did people begin to discuss the proper standard for the admissi-
bility of expert testimony under the new Federal Rules of Evidence.22  With the
adoption of the Rules, the Frye test began a slow decline in the federal courts.
The test was criticized for being too conservative because it imposes a waiting
period while new theories and techniques gain general acceptance.23  During this
waiting period, the law is deprived of valuable information.24  Others criticized
the test for exactly the opposite reason—that it was too liberal because of the
difficulty of defining the relevant field within which general acceptance must be
achieved.  If the field is narrowly defined to include the proffered expert and
other like-minded individuals, little testimony would be excluded.25  Even when
a court settles on the relevant field, determining when and whether general ac-
ceptance was achieved still presents problems.  Another criticism of Frye is that
it leaves the law at the mercy of the judgment of experts in a given field.26
These criticisms and the fact that the reporter’s notes accompanying the
Federal Rules of Evidence did not even mention Frye when discussing the ad-
missibility of expert testimony caused a number of federal circuits to abandon
19. Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental
and demonstrable stages is difficult to define.  Somewhere in this twilight zone the eviden-
tial force of the principle must be recognized, and while the courts will go a long way in
admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discov-
ery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
20. See id.
21. See Faigman et al., supra note 14, at 1808.
22. See id. at 1809.
23. See id. at 1816.
24. Some have argued that the conservatism of Frye is one of its virtues.  For every novel idea that
eventually achieves general acceptance, there are many more that do not.  If scientists are unable to
recognize a breakthrough when they first see it, jurors are unlikely to do better.  For a case praising the
conservative nature of Frye, see People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 325 (Cal. 1994).
25. See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, A
Half Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980).
26. See Faigman et al., supra note 14, at 1816.
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the test.27  The Ninth Circuit, however, is one of several courts that concluded
that Frye did survive the adoption of the rules. 28
B. Daubert
Jason Daubert and Eric Schuler both suffer from limb reduction birth de-
fects.29  They sued Merrell Dow, the manufacturer of Bendectin, claiming that
the morning-sickness drug, which their mothers ingested during pregnancy,
caused their defects. 30  The trial judge granted the defendant’s motion for sum-
mary judgment.31  The court concluded that the strongest inference a jury could
draw from the evidence was “that Bendectin could possibly have caused plain-
tiffs’ injuries,” and that even that inference was insufficient to avoid granting
the defendant’s motion.32  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that
the plaintiffs’ expert testimony was inadmissible because its underlying meth-
odology diverged substantially from the procedures and techniques generally
accepted in the field.33
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, primarily to announce the demise of
Frye.34  Frye’s rigid “general acceptance” standard was held to be contrary to the
thrust of the Federal Rules, which were intended to lower barriers to expert
opinion testimony.35  Rule 702 modifies Rule 402’s directive to admit all relevant
evidence.36  Relevance and qualifications are not enough:  Rule 702 requires re-
liability as well as relevance; evidence that is relevant but unreliable is inadmis-
sible.37  This interpretation of Rule 702 requires us to ask what constitutes reli-
27. The most influential early circuit court opinion rejecting Frye is United States v. Downing, 753
F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).  In a case involving expert testimony on eyewitness identification, Judge
Becker said that to be admitted, the evidence must survive the trial court’s preliminary inquiry.  See id.
at 1237.  In an in limine proceeding, the judge should balance the reliability of the scientific principles
the expert employed against the likelihood that the evidence may overwhelm or mislead the jury.  See
id. at 1226.  In addition, the trial court should examine the “fit” between the proffered scientific testi-
mony and the contested issues in the case.  See id.  Concern with reliability and fit have become corner-
stones of post-Daubert jurisprudence.  The Fifth Circuit set out a similar test for admissibility.  See
Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc).
28. See United States v. Solomon, 753 F.2d 1522, 1526 (9th Cir. 1985).
29. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 571 (S.D. Cal. 1989).
30. See id.
31. See id. at 576.
32. Id.
33. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991).  The court articulated
the Frye rule with the following language:  “Expert opinion based on a scientific technique ‘is admissi-
ble if it is generally accepted as a reliable technique among the scientific community.’” Id. at 1129-30
(quoting United States v. Solomon, 753 F.2d 1522, 1526 (9th Cir. 1985)).
For expert opinion based on a given scientific methodology to be admissible, the methodology
cannot diverge significantly from the procedures accepted by recognized authorities in the
field.  If it does so diverge, it cannot be shown to be “generally accepted as a reliable tech-
nique,” and a district court must exclude it.
Id. at 1130.
34. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,  509 U.S. 579, 583-87 (1993).
35. See id. at 587-88.
36. See FED. R. EVID. 402; Id. 702.
37. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
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ability.  In this case, where all the experts purported to be scientists, the Court
turned to science for an answer, holding that reliable opinions are those that are
arrived at using the “methods and procedures of science.”38  In footnote nine of
the opinion, the Court explained that “[i]n a case involving scientific evidence,
evidentiary reliability will be based upon scientific validity.”39
Daubert did not offer a systematic presentation of what scientists mean
when they inquire into “validity,” but it did offer up four factors courts might
consider when making a reliability/validity assessment: (1) whether the expert’s
theory or technique is falsifiable and has been tested;40 (2) the reliability of a
procedure and its potential rate of error;41 (3) whether the theory or technique
has been subjected to peer review and whether the results have been pub-
lished;42 and (4) in a partial resurrection of the Frye test, whether the expert’s
methods and reasoning enjoy general acceptance in a relevant scientific com-
munity.43
In addition, the Court noted that Rule 702 requires that the expert evidence
“assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in is-
sue.”44  Justice Blackmun wrote that “[t]his condition goes primarily to rele-
vance . . . .  The consideration has been aptly described by Judge Becker as one
of ‘fit.’ ‘Fit’ is not always obvious, and scientific validity for one purpose is not
necessarily scientific validity for other, unrelated purposes.”45  The “fit” re-
quirement mandates an assessment of whether the expert’s chain of reasoning
contains an inferential gap that is too wide.46
38. Id. at 590.
39. Id. at 590 n.9.
40. See id. at 593.
41. See id. at 594.
42. See id. at 593.
43. See id. at 594.
44. Id. at 580.
45. Id. at 591 (citing United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 1985)).
46. Sometimes fit may be understood to refer to the relationship between the general question
asked by a line of research and the question in the case.  Judge Becker provides an example: “[A]nimal
studies may be methodologically acceptable to show that chemical X increases the risk of cancer in
animals, but they may not be methodologically acceptable to show that chemical X increases the risk of
cancer in humans.” In re Paoli, 35 F.3d 717, 743 (3d Cir. 1994).
Courts may also find a lack of fit when the studies presented by the expert simply fail to support the
expert’s position.  Using the “fit” requirement in this way causes courts to move closer to excluding an
expert’s testimony because of the expert’s conclusion.  This is something the Supreme Court in Daubert
specifically cautioned against when it said that the focus of the 702 validity inquiry “must be solely on
principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.”  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595.
Most appellate courts downplayed the Supreme Court’s methodology-conclusion distinction.  For
example, in an important Paoli opinion following Daubert, Judge Becker himself said that “we think
that [the distinction between principles and methods versus conclusions] has only limited practical im-
port . . . .  A challenge to ‘fit’ is very close to a challenge to the expert’s ultimate conclusion about the
particular case, and yet it is part of the judge’s admissibility calculus under Daubert.” Paoli, 35 F.3d at
746.
In General Electric v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), the Supreme Court ratified Judge Becker’s view:
[N]othing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to
admit opinion evidence which is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the ex-
pert.  A court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data
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As with Frye, Daubert is not without its critics.  If the Daubert test allows
judges a more active role and provides for a more nuanced analysis than was
possible under Frye, it is also true that this very flexibility makes Daubert a
more uncertain test that may produce inconsistent admissibility rulings.47
Moreover, the test depends on a minimum level of judicial competence.  Judges
who are not able to make an independent assessment of the reliability of prof-
fered testimony are likely either to return to a Frye-like standard or to admit
the testimony with the thought that the jury can make up its own mind.48  For
better or worse, however, the federal courts are fully committed to Daubert and
most state courts seem to be following in their wake.49
At bottom, the Daubert revolution is about the relationship between judges
and experts, and between law and science.  Frye asked judges to acquiesce to
the judgment of the relevant scientific community.  Daubert, on the other hand,
invites the trial court to make an independent inquiry.50  The judge should de-
termine whether the proffered evidence is reliable by examining the reasoning
and methodology underlying the expert’s testimony.51  As Michael Saks recently
noted, “perhaps the purpose of the rules is simply to hold up a target to the
courts; call one the Frye target and the other the Daubert target.  The Frye ideal
says: do whatever the experts tell you to do.  The Daubert ideal says: figure out
the science yourself.”52
1. Daubert and Non-scientific Testimony.  In footnote eight of the Daubert
opinion, the Court expressly limited its holding to scientific evidence.53  It noted
that Rule 702 applies to “technical or other specialized knowledge” as well but
added that its “discussion [was] limited to the scientific context because that
[was] the nature of the expertise offered” in the case.54  In addition, the opinion
made clear that the four reliability factors—testability, error rate, peer review
and the opinion proffered.  That is what the District Court did here and we hold that it did
not abuse its discretion in so doing.
Id. at 146.
47. In General Electric v. Joiner and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, the Supreme Court empha-
sized that appellate courts should apply an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing trial court ad-
missibility decisions.  This standard makes it theoretically possible for appellate courts to affirm two
trial courts that arrive at opposite admissibility decisions with respect to the same testimony.  See Gen-
eral Elec., 522 U.S. at 141; Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 142.  It is too soon to know whether this will be-
come a significant problem.
48. See JOSEPH SANDERS, BENDECTIN ON TRIAL: A STUDY OF MASS TORT LITIGATION 122
(1998).
49. See Heather G. Hamilton, The Movement From Frye to Daubert: Where Do the States Stand?,
38 JURIMETRICS J. 201 (1998).
50. See Michael J. Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law’s Formative Encounters with
Forensic Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS L. J. 1069, 1139 (1998).
51. To be sure, the opinion allows judges to make use of surrogate indicia of reliability.  Peer re-
view and publication and general acceptance in the scientific community are factors judges may con-
sider, but they are secondary to a direct assessment of the testimony’s scientific validity.  See Daubert,
509 U.S. at 592-93.
52. Saks, supra note 50, at 1139.
53. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.8.
54. Id.
SANDERS_FMT.DOC 04/23/01  11:45 AM
380 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 64: Nos. 2 & 3
and publication, and general acceptance—are not exclusive.55  These passages
present two related questions to post-Daubert courts:  Does Daubert’s reliability
requirement apply at all to non-scientific evidence and, if it does, what role do
the Daubert factors play in these cases?
Many, perhaps most, courts concluded that Daubert applied to non-scientific
testimony, but often courts could not agree about the proper role of the Dau-
bert factors.  Moore v. Ashland Chemical, Inc.56 provides an instructive example.
In Moore, the appellant was forced to clean up a spill of solvents inside the back
of a truck.57  The trial judge excluded the causation testimony of one of the
plaintiff’s experts, a specialist in pulmonary, environmental, and internal medi-
cine, that the one-hour exposure caused the plaintiff to suffer from reactive air-
ways dysfunction syndrome (“RADS”).58  The trial court excluded his testimony
on Rule 702 grounds.59  The plaintiff appealed, and a panel of the Fifth Circuit
reversed, ruling that the exclusion was in error.60  It held that while Daubert ap-
plied to all expert evidence, the Daubert factors are “hard” science methods or
techniques that should apply only to experts who profess to base their testi-
mony on “hard” science knowledge.61  These criteria should not be used to
judge the admissibility of a clinical physician’s expert testimony.62  Rather, that
testimony should be judged by the principles and methodology of the field of
clinical medicine.63  After an en banc review, the full circuit reversed and rein-
stated the judgment for the defendant.64  The en banc opinion turned primarily
on a “fit” analysis; however, the opinion does support the use of Daubert factors
when assessing the admissibility of clinical medical testimony.65
The role of the Daubert factors has arisen in other areas as well.  This occurs
most frequently when the expert’s testimony is said to rest on her “experience.”
Two groups of cases stand out in this regard: those dealing with forensic testi-
mony in the criminal context and those dealing with products liability design de-
fect testimony.
55. See id. at 593-94 n.12.
56. 126 F.3d 679 (5th Cir. 1997), vacated en banc, 151 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 1998).
57. See id. at 683.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 699.
60. The appeal followed a trial on the merits.  The case went to trial because the trial court allowed
the plaintiff’s treating physician to testify on causation.  This was a strange pair of rulings because, as
the appellate court notes, most of the testimony of the treating physician was based on the tests and as-
sessment of the excluded witness.  The jury returned a verdict for the defendant, the plaintiff appealed,
and the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. This determination resulted in an order granting a re-
hearing en banc.  See id. at 716.
61. See id. at 682.
62. See id. at 701.
63. See id.
64. See Moore v. Ashland Chem., Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 279 (5th Cir. 1998).
65. See id.
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2. Forensic Evidence.  United States v. Starzecpyzel,66 one of the first post-
Daubert forensic evidence cases, rejected a handwriting identification expert’s
claim to scientific status.67  Handwriting experts are not practicing science within
the meaning of Daubert because they do not test their theories, and their
findings have unknown error rates.68  Because handwriting experts are not
scientists, Daubert’s reliability criteria do not apply.69  Judge McKenna drew an
analogy not unlike the beekeeper example.70  A handwriting expert is like a
harbor pilot who learns to do something dependably by experience.71  He
concluded, based on little more than “simple logic,” that forgery detection can
be performed with sufficient reliability to be admissible.72  He did, however,
craft an instruction to be given in advance of the expert’s taking the stand
explaining that the testimony was not the result of a scientific process.73
The Starzecpyzel approach was followed in United States v. Jones.74  Al-
though the Sixth Circuit agreed with Judge McKenna that handwriting experts
are not practicing science, it affirmed a trial judge’s decision to admit hand-
writing testimony, in part by arguing that the expert’s past experience as a wit-
ness was evidence that his testimony was reliable.75
3. Products Liability.  Compton v. Subaru of America, Inc.76 is one of
several post-Daubert opinions holding that the Daubert factors are inapplicable
in a products liability design defect context where expert testimony is based
solely upon experience.77  In Compton, the plaintiff’s expert testified that the
defendant’s roof design was defective because it permitted excessive roof
crush.78  The trial court was uncertain as to whether Daubert applied.79  The
Tenth Circuit was not:  “The language in Daubert makes clear the factors
outlined by the Court are applicable only when a proffered expert relies on
some principle or methodology.  In other words, application of the Daubert
factors is unwarranted in cases where expert testimony is based solely upon
experience or training.”80  The Compton court agreed that Rule 702 requires the
66. 880 F. Supp. 1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); see also United States v. Velasquez, 64 F.3d 844 (3d Cir.
1995).
67. “Were the court to apply Daubert to the proffered FDE [forensic document examiner] testi-
mony, it would have to be excluded.”  See Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. at 1036.
68. See id. at 1038.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 1029.
71. See id.
72. See id. at 1046.
73. See id. at 1050-51.
74. 107 F.3d 1147 (6th Cir. 1997).
75. See id. at 1160.  In the aftermath of Kumho, however, at least one federal district court has re-
fused to allow the government’s handwriting expert to testify that the defendant was the author of a
note used in a bank robbery.  See United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. Mass. 1999).
76. 82 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1996).
77. See id. at 1518-19.
78. See id. at 1516.
79. See id. at 1517.
80. Id. at 1518.
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trial court to make a preliminary finding that proffered testimony is both
relevant and reliable,81 but the Rule offers no guidelines as to how lower courts
should go about this task in cases where expert testimony is based on
experience.
Although not all courts agreed that Daubert was inapplicable to experience
testimony,82 Compton was not an anomaly.83  The Supreme Court finally inter-
vened in this debate in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael.84
C. Kumho Tire v. Carmichael
In July of 1993, eight members of the Carmichael family were involved in a
serious automobile accident when the right rear tire of their minivan failed be-
cause the tire tread became separated from its inner steel-belted carcass.85  After
the accident, the plaintiffs’ expert examined the tire and concluded that the
failure was not the result of any abuse.86  Therefore, he concluded that the fail-
ure was caused by a defect in either the tire’s design or its manufacture.87  Prior
to his testimony, the expert became ill and transferred the case to his employee,
Dennis Carlson, who reviewed the file and confirmed the initial conclusion.88
Carlson did not personally examine the tire prior to rendering his opinion and
inspected the tire for the first time approximately one hour prior to his deposi-
81. See id. at 1519.  In Talkington v. Atria Reclamelucifers Fabrieken BV, 152 F.3d 254, 265-66 (4th
Cir. 1998), the Fourth Circuit appears to have taken the unusual position that qualifications and rele-
vance, but not reliability, are prerequisites for non-science testimony.
82. For example, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the Daubert factors do apply:
We agree for the reasons stated by the Seventh and Eighth Circuits that the Daubert
analysis applies to the type of expert testimony presented by Williams.  Not every guidepost
outlined in Daubert will necessarily apply to expert testimony based on engineering principles
and practical experience, but the district court’s “preliminary assessment of whether the rea-
soning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that rea-
soning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue” is no less important . . . .
[T]he nonexclusive list of factors relevant under Daubert to assessing scientific methodol-
ogy—testing, peer review, and “general acceptance”—are also relevant to assessing other
types of expert evidence.  Whether the expert would opine on economic valuation, advertising
psychology, or engineering, application of the Daubert factors is germane to evaluating
whether the expert is a hired gun or a person whose opinion in the courtroom will withstand
the same scrutiny that it would among his professional peers . . . .  Further, it seems exactly
backwards that experts who purport to rely on general engineering principles and practical
experience might escape screening by the district court simply by stating that their conclusions
were not reached by any particular method or technique.  The moral of this approach would
be, the less factual support for an expert’s opinion, the better.
Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 990-91 (5th Cir. 1997) (citations and footnotes omitted);
see also Peitzmeier v. Hennessy Indus., 97 F.3d 293, 297 (8th  Cir. 1996).
83. See McKendall v. Crown Control Corp., 122 F.3d 803, 806 (9th Cir. 1997); Talkington, 152 F.3d
at 254.
84. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).  Between Daubert and Kumho, the Supreme Court decided General Elec-
tric. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).  In Joiner, the Court concluded that trial court 702 rulings should
be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.  See id.




SANDERS_FMT.DOC 04/23/01  11:45 AM
Page 373: Spring/Summer 2001]KUMHO AND HOW WE KNOW 383
tion by the defendant.89  The defendant moved to exclude Carlson’s testimony
because it could not satisfy Daubert.90  The trial judge agreed and found that
“none of the four admissibility criteria outlined by the Daubert court [were]
satisfied in this case.”91  Because the expert testimony was the plaintiff’s only
evidence of defect, the district judge then granted the defendant summary
judgment.92  Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the district court should not have
applied Daubert’s reliability framework because Carlson was not a “scientific”
expert.93
The Eleventh Circuit undertook a de novo review of the trial court’s deci-
sion to apply Daubert and its decision to exclude the particular evidence under
an abuse of discretion standard.94  In an opinion that echoes and relies upon
Compton, the court concluded that Daubert applies only to scientific testimony,
that Carlson’s testimony was non-scientific, and that the district court therefore
erred as a matter of law in applying the Daubert criteria.95
How did the court determine Carlson was not a scientific expert?  Appar-
ently, it allowed him to self-define his status and, based on this self-definition,
compared him to Berry’s beekeeper.96  Self-definition would have little conse-
quence if the court invoked equally stringent admissibility criteria regardless of
whether the expertise is science or experience based.  The Eleventh Circuit de-
clared itself prepared to affirm a well-reasoned trial court decision to exclude
Carlson’s testimony on reliability grounds if, upon remand, the trial court did so
without invoking the Daubert criteria.97  However, in another part of the opin-
ion the appellate court noted that
the question in this case is whether Carlson’s testimony is based on his application of
scientific principles or theories (which we should submit to a Daubert analysis) or on
his utilization of personal experience and skill with failed tires (which we would usu-
ally expect a district court to allow a jury to evaluate).98
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1514, 1521 (S.D. Ala. 1996).
92. See id. at 1524.
93. See Carmichael, 131 F.3d at 1435.
94. See id. at 1435.
95. See id. at 1435-36.
96. The Eleventh Circuit stated:
Although Samyang is no doubt correct that the laws of physics and chemistry are impli-
cated in the failure of the Carmichaels’ tire, Carlson makes no pretense of basing his opinion
on any scientific theory of physics or chemistry.  Instead, Carlson rests his opinion on his expe-
rience in analyzing failed tires.  After years of looking at the mangled carcasses of blown-out
tires, Carlson claims that he can identify telltale markings revealing whether a tire failed be-
cause of abuse or defect.  Like a beekeeper who claims to have learned through years of obser-
vation that his charges always take flight into the wind, Carlson maintains that his experiences
in analyzing tires have taught him what “bead grooves” and “sidewall deterioration” indicate
as to the cause of a tire’s failure.
Id. at 1436 (footnotes omitted).
97. See id. at 1436 n.9.
98. Id. at 1436.
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This discussion suggests a more lenient admissibility standard for non-scientific
experts.
The trial court never got a second chance.  The Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari, reversed the Eleventh Circuit, and held that excluding Carlson’s testi-
mony was not an abuse of discretion.99  The Court provided four reasons why
Daubert’s general reliability requirement applies to all expert testimony.100
First, the language of Rule 702 makes no relevant distinction between “scien-
tific” knowledge and “technical” or “other specialized” knowledge.101  Second,
although the Daubert opinion did restrict itself to “scientific” knowledge, that
was only because the issue presented in the case involved scientific expertise.102
Third, the evidentiary rationale that underlies the gatekeeping requirement is
that Rules 702 and 703 give wide latitude to all experts to offer their opinion,
latitude that is unavailable to other witnesses.103  This latitude is premised on the
“assumption that the expert’s opinion will have a reliable basis in the knowl-
edge and experience of his discipline.”104  Because the Rules grant this latitude
to all experts, all must meet the reliability standard.105  Fourth, a rule that distin-
guishes between scientific experts and other experts would be very difficult, if
not impossible, to administer.106  No clear line divides one from the other.107
Kumho itself provides a case in point:  Based on the notion that engineering tes-
timony rests on scientific foundations, several amicus briefs from engineers and
engineering groups argued that engineering is science or is sufficiently science-
like that the Daubert factors should apply.108
The Court adopted a more flexible position:
We also conclude that a trial court may consider one or more of the more specific fac-
tors that Daubert mentioned when doing so will help determine that testimony’s reli-
ability.  But, as the Court stated in Daubert, the test of reliability is “flexible,” and
Daubert’s list of specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to all ex-
perts or in every case.  Rather, the law grants a district court the same broad latitude
99. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).  Justice Stevens dissented to this part
of the opinion and argued that the case should have been remanded to the Eleventh Circuit to deter-
mine whether the trial judge had abused his discretion.  See id. at 159 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).  In Wisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440 (2000), the district court entered a
judgment on a jury verdict for plaintiff and denied defendant’s motion for a judgment as a matter of
law or a new trial.  The Eighth Circuit vacated and directed entry of judgment as a matter of law for the
manufacturer after concluding the trial court had erred in admitting expert testimony.  See id. at 445.
The plaintiff appealed, arguing the appellate court abused its discretion when it failed to remand the
case to the trial court.  See id.  The Supreme Court held that this was not an abuse of discretion and that
appellate courts may direct entry of judgment as a matter of law upon determining that after the exclu-
sion, there is no longer sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict.  See id.
100. See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 147-49.
101. Id. at 147.
102. See id. at 147-48.
103. See id. at 148.
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when it decides how to determine reliability as it enjoys in respect to its ultimate reli-
ability determination.109
Justice Breyer noted that all four of the Daubert factors do not necessarily ap-
ply even in situations where the reliability of scientific evidence is at issue.110  A
claim may never have been exposed to peer review because the particular issue
may never have interested anyone.  It would be a mistake, however, to read
Kumho to say that the trial court may simply ignore the Daubert factors in non-
science cases.  The Court noted that “a trial court should consider the specific
factors identified in Daubert where they are reasonable measures of the reli-
ability of expert testimony.”111  In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia, joined by
Justices O’Connor and Thomas, added that the discretion enjoyed by the trial
court does not include the discretion to abandon the gatekeeping function or to
perform it inadequately.112  “Though, as the Court makes clear today, the Dau-
bert factors are not holy writ, in a particular case the failure to apply one or an-
other of them may be unreasonable, and hence an abuse of discretion.”113  A
trial court that fails to justify its decision not to use Daubert factors risks rever-
sal.114
As it did in its earlier opinion in General Electric Co. v. Joiner,115 the Court
offered a detailed analysis of the excluded expert testimony.  According to the
Supreme Court, the question in the case was one of specific causation and par-
ticular methodology.116  The issue was not whether it is ever possible for a tire
expert to use visual and tactile inspection methods to determine whether a tire
is defective.117  Rather, the specific issue was whether this particular tire was de-
fective, as well as the reliability of Carlson’s methods.118
Carlson’s theory was that if the vehicle had been overloaded or the tire un-
der-inflated, it would have led to a phenomenon called “overdeflection.”119
Overdeflection can cause the tire to overheat, which, in turn, can undo the bond
that holds the tire tread to the carcass.120  Carlson described four indicia of over-
109. Id. at 141-42.
110. See id. at 149-50.
111. Id. at 152.
112. See id. at 158-59 (Scalia, J., concurring).
113. Id. at 159.
114. See Black v. Food Lion, Inc., 171 F.3d 308, 311-12 (5th Cir. 1999) (“In the vast majority of
cases, the district court first should decide whether the factors mentioned in Daubert are appropriate.
Once it considers the Daubert factors, the court then can consider whether other factors, not men-
tioned in Daubert, are relevant to the case at hand.”).
115. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
116. See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 154.  In this respect, the issue in the Kumho case is similar to an issue
that arises frequently in toxic tort cases.  There, as here, courts distinguish “general causation,” whether
a given cause can ever produce a given effect, from “specific causation,” which asks,  did that cause this
effect in this particular case?  Here, as in toxic tort cases, plaintiffs who are able to show general causa-
tion may still fail to show that it was more likely than not that their particular injury was caused in the
manner they allege.
117. See id. at 153-54.
118. See id. at 153.
119. Id. at 144.
120. See id.
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deflection and adopted the rule that if a tire exhibited two of the four, he would
say it had been abused.121  He conceded that the tire exhibited some of these in-
dicia, but he testified that the symptoms were not significant enough to con-
clude that the tire had been abused.122
For example, according to Carlson, one of the symptoms of overdeflection is
tread wear on the tire’s shoulder greater than tread wear along the tire’s cen-
ter.123  Carlson concluded that there was greater wear on the shoulders, but he
also concluded that it was not evenly distributed on both shoulders.124  Rather,
the wear appeared primarily on one shoulder, whereas an overdeflected tire
would show equal abnormal wear on both.125  Therefore, this wear was not evi-
dence of overdeflection.126
In another part of his testimony, Carlson was asked how many miles the tire
had traveled prior to the accident.127  According to the Supreme Court, he
“could not say whether the tire had traveled more than 10, or 20, or 30, or 40, or
50 thousand miles, adding that 6,000 miles was ‘about how far’ he could ‘say
with any certainty.’”128  To this, the Supreme Court responded:
The [trial] court could reasonably have wondered about the reliability of a method of
visual and tactile inspection sufficiently precise to ascertain with some certainty the
abuse-related significance of minute shoulder/center relative tread wear differences,
but insufficiently precise to tell “with any certainty” from the tread wear whether a
tire had traveled less than 10,000 or more than 50,000 miles.  And these concerns
might have been augmented by Carlson’s repeated reliance on the “subjective[ness]”
of his mode of analysis in response to questions seeking specific information regarding
how he could differentiate between a tire that actually had been overdeflected and a
tire that merely looked as though it had been.129
Although the Supreme Court did not specifically tie this analysis to a Daubert
factor, the reference to subjectivity suggests that the Court was questioning the
falsifiability of Carlson’s theory.  The Court also noted that lack of general ac-
ceptance of his specific test, as well as of his decision rule that a tire has not
been abused unless it exhibits two of his four overdeflection symptoms; moreo-
121. The court summarized his testimony:
These symptoms include (a) tread wear on the tire’s shoulder that is greater than the tread
wear along the tire’s center; (b) signs of a “bead groove,” where the beads have been pushed
too hard against the bead seat on the inside of the tire’s rim; (c) sidewalls of the tire with
physical signs of deterioration, such as discoloration; and/or (d) marks on the tire’s rim
flange. . . . Carlson said that where he does not find at least two of the four physical signs just
mentioned (and presumably where there is no reason to suspect a less common cause of sepa-
ration), he concludes that a manufacturing or design defect caused the separation.
Id. at 144.





127. See id. at 154-55.
128. Id. at 155.
129. Id.
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ver, the Court found no general acceptance of an expert’s ability to make the
very fine distinctions made by Carlson.130
The Court was less helpful in offering some insight into what factors, in ad-
dition to the four Daubert factors, the trial court might use to assess reliability.
According to the Supreme Court, the purpose of the relevancy and reliability
requirements under Daubert is “to make certain that an expert, whether basing
testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the
courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of
an expert in the relevant field.”131  Carlson’s testimony did not measure up to
this standard.132
Useful though it may be as a way of thinking about the admissibility of ex-
pert witnesses, the same intellectual rigor test is not a factor similar to the four
Daubert factors.  Rather, it is a conclusion one may draw after examining the
proffered testimony.  The Supreme Court came to this conclusion about Carl-
son only after subjecting his testimony to a Daubert-like analysis.133  Ultimately,
Kumho does not provide additional factors courts might consider when dealing
with non-scientific expertise.134  We are left with the key question:  How should
we think about admissibility standards for non-scientific evidence?  I believe the
answer requires that we first explore Daubert’s implicit understanding of the na-
ture of scientific knowledge and then turn to the question of how scientific
knowledge differs from other knowledge, especially knowledge that is said to be
based on experience.
III
SCIENTIFIC AND OTHER KNOWLEDGE
A. Daubert’s Implicit Scientific Epistemology
In the aftermath of the Daubert opinion, a number of articles have appeared
that either praise or criticize Justice Blackmun’s understanding of science and
130. See id. at 157.
131. Id. at 152.  The “same intellectual rigor” standard first appears in a pair of Seventh Circuit
opinions authored by Judge Posner.  See Braun v. Lorillard Inc., 84 F.3d 230, 234 (7th Cir. 1996); Rosen
v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 318 (7th Cir. 1996).  Post-Kumho appellate opinions have been quick
to incorporate this standard into their opinions.  See, e.g., Black v. Food Lion, Inc., 171 F.3d 308, 311
(5th Cir. 1999).
132. As the Court noted:
Indeed, no one has argued that Carlson himself, were he still working for Michelin, would
have concluded in a report to his employer that a similar tire was similarly defective on grounds
identical to those upon which he rested his conclusion here.  Of course, Carlson himself claimed
that his method was accurate, but, as we pointed out in Joiner, “nothing in either Daubert or the
Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected
to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.”
Kumho, 526 U.S. at 157 (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997)).
133. See id.
134. For a similar conclusion, see Edward J. Imwinkelried, Evaluating the Reliability of Nonscientific
Expert Testimony: A Partial Answer to the Questions Left Unresolved by Kumho Tire Co. v. Car-
michael, 52 ME. L. REV. 19 (2000).
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the scientific enterprise.135  The fact that some authors claim that Daubert comes
closer than Frye to capturing the essential nature of the scientific enterprise,136
while others see it as a fundamentally wrong turn,137 suggests the substantial di-
versity of opinion concerning the epistemological underpinnings of science.
Most would agree, however, that Daubert offers a relatively unsophisticated
view of science.138  The court’s admissibility rulings seem to have proceeded in
happy obliviousness to the “science wars”139 that arguably began with Fleck,140
flourished with Kuhn141 and Feyerabend,142 and have raged for much of the last
half century between the defenders of a more traditional, positivist view of sci-
ence and those critics who emphasize its historical, political, social, and rhetori-
cal aspects.143  There is a sense in which Daubert is on both sides of this divide.144
135. See Ronald J. Allen, Expertise and the Daubert Decision, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1157
(1994); M. Neil Browne et al., The Epistemological Role of Expert Witnesses and Toxic Torts, 36 AM.
BUS. L.J. 1 (1998); Margaret G. Farrell, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Epistemology
and Legal Process, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2183 (1994); Heidi Li Feldman, Science and Uncertainty in
Mass Exposure Litigation, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1995); Randoph N. Jonakait, The Assessment of Exper-
tise: Transcending Construction, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 301 (1997); Brian Leiter, The Epistemology
of Admissibility: Why Even Good Philosophy of Science Would Not Make For Good Philosophy of
Evidence, 1997 BYU L. REV. 803 (1997); Sean O’Connor, The Supreme Court’s Philosophy of Science:
Will the Real Karl Popper Please Stand Up?, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 263 (1995); Adina Schwartz, A
“Dogma of Empiricism” Revisited: Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and the Need to Res-
urrect the Philosophical Insight of Frye v. United States, 10 HARV.  J. L. & TECH. 149 (1997).
136. See generally Feldman, supra note 135.
137. See generally Farrell, supra note 135; Schwartz, supra note 135.
138. See Farrell, supra note 135, at 2185 (“Because Justice Blackmun’s opinion equivocates between
[a positivist and a social constructionist view of science], it sets out contradictory instructions to federal
judges faced with submissions of scientific evidence.”); Joseph Sanders, Scientific Validity, Admissibil-
ity, and Mass Torts After Daubert, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1387 (1994); Schwartz, supra note 135.
139. See IAN HACKING, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF WHAT? (1999) (discussing disagreements
between sociology and philosophy of science about the nature of the scientific enterprise); David S.
Caudill, Law & the Science Wars: Introduction to the Forum, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 545 (1999).
140. See LUDWIK FLECK, GENESIS AND DEVELOPMENT OF A SCIENTIFIC FACT (Phoenix ed. 1981)
(originally published in 1935) (distinguishing between vadem ecum—handbook science—and journal
science, which is at the cutting edge).
141. See THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962) (arguing the sci-
entific change is a revolutionary process).
142. See PAUL K. FEYERABEND, AGAINST METHOD: OUTLINE OF AN ANARCHISTIC THEORY OF
KNOWLEDGE (1975) (arguing that every method is as good as, and thus as bad as, every other).
143. See INFERENCE, EXPLANATION, AND OTHER PHILOSOPHICAL FRUSTRATIONS: ESSAYS IN
THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE (John Earmon ed., 1992); PHILIP KITCHER, THE ADVANCEMENT OF
SCIENCE: SCIENCE WITHOUT LEGEND, OBJECTIVITY WITHOUT ILLUSIONS (1993); BRUNO LATOUR,
PANDORA’S HOPE: ESSAYS ON THE REALITY OF SCIENCE STUDIES (1999); JARRETT LEPIN, A
NOVEL DEFENSE OF SCIENTIFIC REALISM (1997); THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE (David Papineau
ed., 1996); SCIENCE AS PRACTICE AND CULTURE (Andrew Pickering ed., 1992); STEVEN SHAPIN, THE
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION (1996).
144. This article is not the place for a lengthy discussion of current issues in the sociology and phi-
losophy of science, and, in any case, I am not the best person for the task.  However, a few observations
are in order.
For legal purposes, the key issues in the philosophy of science are epistemological, the justification
of claims to scientific knowledge.  See David Papineau, Introduction to THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
1-20 (David Papineau ed., 1996).  In the first half of the 1900s, the dominant tradition was the logical
empiricism of Rudolph Carnap and Carl Hempel.  See id. at 1.  They used the techniques of formal
logic and mathematics to formulate theories of scientific explanation.  See id.  In the 1960s, the logic-
based approach was challenged by historically-oriented work of people such as Thomas Kuhn, who ar-
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The Frye test implicitly places its trust in expert communities as neutral,
truth-seeking collectives whose opinions are derived by an acceptable process.145
Daubert is a more skeptical test, decided against a background of an emerging
belief that courts were experiencing a growth in “junk science.”146  Daubert af-
fords relatively less legitimacy to elite, authoritative opinions and is less willing
to accept the idea that communities of experts are the sole arbiters of special-
ized knowledge.147  In this sense, Daubert is consistent with a social construc-
tionist view of science.148
This increased sensitivity to social, political, and economic pressures that
impinge on expert judgment is reflected in a fifth admissibility factor frequently
cited in post-Daubert opinions: whether experts are proposing to testify about
matters growing naturally and directly out of research they conducted inde-
pendent of the litigation.149  This criterion is now mentioned so frequently in
federal admissibility opinions that it might be thought of as a fifth factor.150  The
“non-judicial uses” test is a judicial acknowledgment that external pressures
may bias expert testimony.151
gued that the presuppositions of logical empiricism bore little resemblance to the reality of scientific
practice.  See id. at 2.  Papineau notes that “one by-product of this historical turn was that many became
skeptical about the possibility of any objective standards of scientific rationality and came to view the-
ory choices as nothing but expressions of social and institutional pressures.” Id. at 2.  Others, however,
are unwilling to conclude that science lacks all rationality.
Much of the current debate concerning the epistemology of science turns on one’s commitment to
scientific realism.  See id. at 2.  Papineau takes realism to involve two theses: an independence thesis that
our judgments answer for their truth to a world that exists independently of our awareness of it, and a
knowledge thesis that, by and large, we can know which of these judgements are true.  See id.  Idealists
reject the first thesis, the notion of some further world beyond the world as we perceive it.  See id.
Most modern critics of the realist tradition in the philosophy and sociology of science are not idealist.
See id.  Rather, they are skeptics who reject the knowledge thesis and accept the idea that we cannot
know the truth about the world although scientific theories might be useful fictions for predictive pur-
poses.  See id. at 4.
One important conclusion to be drawn from this discussion is that holding a social constructionist
view of the scientific enterprise, that is that science is embedded in and influenced by the society
around it, does not inevitably compel one to accept an anti-realist, skeptical position with respect to the
knowledge thesis.
145. See Saks, supra note 50.
146. See PETER HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 6 (1991).
Whether there is a “junk science” problem is controversial.  For a response to Huber, see Kenneth J.
Chesebro, Galileo’s Retort: Peter Huber’s Junk Scholarship, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1637 (1993).  The issue
has resurfaced in the silicone implant litigation.  See MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE
CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND THE LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE (1996); Rebecca S.
Dresser et al., Breast Implants Revisited: Beyond Science on Trial, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 705.
147. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993).
148. See SCIENCE AS PRACTICE AND CULTURE, supra note 143; SHAPIN, supra note 143; see also
Mark R. Patterson, Conflicts of Interest in Scientific Expert Testimony, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1313
(1999).
149. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995).
150. The advisory committee notes accompanying the proposed revisions to Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 702 lists five factors in addition to the factors listed in Daubert that courts have considered when
deciding whether testimony is sufficiently reliable to be admitted.  The first is the non-judicial uses test.
See STAFF OF STANDING COMM. ON THE RULES OF EVIDENCE, 106TH CONG., PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO FED. RULES OF EVIDENCE 47 (Comm. Print 1999).
151. Patterson notes that external  pressures do not come exclusively in the form of research done at
the behest of an attorney.  For example, a good deal of the research conducted in areas such as phar-
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If, however, a social constructionist admissibility test is interpreted to mean
that the test reflects a belief that scientific conclusions are solely the result of
social processes within and outside the scientific community, Daubert offers
anything but such a test.  The opinion requires judges to become sufficiently
knowledgeable about scientific methods so they can fairly assess the validity of
evidence offered at trial.  The requirement that scientific testimony must pass
methodological muster reflects a positivist approach that is slanted toward a
Baconian view of science.152  The opinion cites with favor a Popperian view of
how to distinguish the scientific enterprise from other forms of knowledge.153
In this regard, the Daubert opinion is not unique.  Both legislatures and ad-
ministrative agencies frequently distinguish the process of science from its
products.  They accept the constructionist insight that the process of doing sci-
ence is a social enterprise and is subject to the buffeting, often distorting winds
of social, political, economic, and legal influences.  At the same time, they cling
to a realist belief that the products of science may state a truth about the world,
or at least something so similar to truth as it is commonly understood at a given
point in history, that the practical discipline of law does not need to concern it-
self with the difference.
In sum, Daubert adopts what Stephen Cole calls a realist-constructivist view
of science—that is, that science is socially constructed both in the laboratory
and in the wider community, but that the construction is constrained by input
from the empirical world.154  It rejects what he calls a relativist-constructionist
position that claims nature has little or no influence on the cognitive content of
science.155
There is a large dose of pragmatism in all of this, of course, and the Daubert
rule itself has been cited as an example of “the common law’s genius for mud-
dling through on the basis of experience rather than logic.”156  Nevertheless, in
my judgment, given the ordinary ways in which law consumes science, Daubert’s
implicit epistemology is defensible.  Anti-realists appear to be on rather firm
ground when they question the truth of any scientific theory because almost all
past theories, from Ptolemaic astronomy to Newtonian physics, are now
thought to be wrong.  Why, therefore, would one have any faith that current
macology is done at the behest of and with funding from companies that frequently appear as defen-
dants in litigation concerning the products being studied.  See Patterson, supra note 148, at 1346.  Nev-
ertheless, legal and scientific experts alike note the substantial additional pressures placed on an expert
who becomes a party witness in an adversarial system.  See  Mike Redmayne, Expert Evidence and Sci-
entific Disagreement, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1027, 1071 (1997).
152. See David Faigman et al., How Good is Good Enough? Expert Evidence under Daubert and
Kumho, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 645, 667 (2000).
153. See KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY (1968) (arguing that falsifiabil-
ity is at the heart of the scientific method).
154. See STEPHEN COLE, MAKING SCIENCE: BETWEEN NATURE AND SOCIETY at x (1992).  For
somewhat similar views, see SERGIO SISMONDO, SCIENCE WITHOUT MYTH: ON CONSTRUCTIONS,
REALITY, AND SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE (1995).
155. See COLE, supra note 154, at x.
156. SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA 63
(1995).
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theories are true?157  At a more prosaic level, however, scientific methods ap-
pear to be superior to their alternatives when it comes to predicting mundane
matters such as next week’s weather or the effect of a chemical on people who
are exposed to it.158  In both the administrative and the courtroom context, law is
most frequently interested in acquiring scientific answers to such practical ques-
tions of causation (for example, does exposure to airborne asbestos cause lung
cancer) and measurement (for example, what is the alcohol level in a driver’s
blood).  Theoretical questions are frequently of secondary interest, useful, if at
all, only insofar as they help courts and regulators to choose among conflicting
measurements, extrapolations, or causal assertions.
Daubert’s focus on methods is a search for some assurance that the expert
has given the empirical world a reasonable opportunity to influence and con-
strain the expert’s conclusions.  Ultimately, the law’s epistemology with respect
to science holds that there are a set of (social) practices often given the short-
hand name “the scientific method” that increase the likelihood that someone
will make positive contributions to knowledge; a set of practices to which scien-
tists themselves frequently point as the sources of past scientific success.159
B. From Scientific Expertise to the Wider World of Expert Knowledge
In the aftermath of Kumho, a central question confronting the justices is the
applicability of scientific practices to other fields.  Kumho resisted any tempta-
tion to provide a taxonomy of these patterns of knowledge.  The opinion is
peppered with passages reflecting on the complexity of expert opinion.160  Be-
157. See THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, supra note 143, at 10-11.
158. See ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, KNOWLEDGE IN A SOCIAL WORLD 249 (1999); John Worrall, Struc-
tural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds? in THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, supra note 143, at 139 (of-
fering a more ambitious defense of what he calls “structural realism”).
159. See GOLDMAN, supra note 158.  Goldman provides one list of the dimensions of scientific prac-
tice that seem to play a role in science’s relative success.  They are
(1) An emphasis on precise measurement, controlled test, and observation, including a
philosophy, organon, and technology for more and more powerful observation.
(2) A systematic and sophisticated set of inferential principles for drawing conclusions
about hypotheses from observations of experimental results.
(3) The marshaling and distribution of resources to facilitate scientific investigation and ob-
servation.
(4) A system of credit and reward that provides incentives for workers to engage in scien-
tific research and to distribute their efforts in chosen directions.
(5) A system for disseminating scientific findings and theories as well as critical assessments
of such findings and theories.
(6) The use of domain-specific expertise in making decisions about dissemination, resource
allocation and rewards.
Id. at 250-51.
160. Consider, for example, the following three statements:
(1)  “As the Solicitor General points out, there are many different kinds of experts, and many
different kinds of expertise.”  Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150 (1999).
(2)   The conclusion, in our view, is that we can neither rule out, nor rule in, for all cases and
for all time the applicability of the factors mentioned in Daubert, nor can we now do so
for subsets of cases categorized by category of expert or by kind of evidence.  Too much
depends upon the particular circumstances of the particular case at issue.
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cause the Daubert factors may or may not be applicable to each situation, it is
apparent that there are no bright lines in Kumho.
Repeatedly, however, the Court refers to the one difference that was fun-
damental to the Eleventh Circuit opinion: expert opinion that “relies ‘on the
application of scientific principles’” versus expert opinion that relies “‘on skill-
or experience-based observation.’”161  Experience-based opinion testimony
arises in numerous contexts, including products liability cases such as Kumho,
forensic testimony,162 and clinical medical testimony.163
Although courts and commentators have singled out experience-based
judgments for special comment, there have been few systematic discussions
about the nature of such knowledge and how it differs from knowledge ac-
quired in other ways.  In this section, I turn to a body of social-psychology lit-
erature that sheds some light on the nature of experience-based judgments and
the potential biases that threaten this and other ways of arriving at an expert
opinion.164
1. Types of Reasoning.  Over the last decade, Seymour Epstein and his
colleagues have written a number of articles discussing their research on the
ways individuals process information.165  This work is part of a larger body of
        Id.
(3)  “We do not believe that Rule 702 creates a schematism that segregates expertise by type
while mapping certain kinds of questions to certain kinds of experts.  Life and the legal cases
that it generates are too complex to warrant so definitive a match.” Id. at 151.
161. Id. at 146 (quoting Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433, 1435-36 (1997)).
162. See United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1127 (1997).
163. See Moore v. Ashland Chem., Inc., 126 F.3d 679 (5th Cir. 1997), vacated en banc, 151 F.3d 269
(5th Cir. 1998).
164. My emphasis on the psychological research on how we process information places this part of
the article in the tradition of naturalized epistemology.  See Leiter, supra note 135, at 805.  This tradi-
tion can be distinguished from a more analytical epistemology, which tends to view epistemological
questions in an apsychological way.  From this analytical perspective, logic, not psychology, is the
proper basis for epistemological discussions.  See Philip Kitcher, The Naturalists Return, 101 PHIL. REV.
53, 57 (1992).  For an epistemological discussion in the naturalist tradition, see ALVIN I. GOLDMAN,
PHILOSOPHICAL APPLICATIONS OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE (1993).
165. See Veronika Denes-Raj & Seymour Epstein, Conflict Between Intuitive and Rational Process-
ing: When People Behave Against Their Better Judgment, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 819
(1994); Seymour Epstein, The Implications of Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory for Research in Social
Psychology and Personality, 15 J. THEORY SOC. BEHAV. 283  (1985) [hereinafter Epstein, Implications
of CEST]; Seymour Epstein et al., Individual Differences in Intuitive-Experiential and Analytical-
Rational Thinking Styles, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 390 (1996) [hereinafter Epstein et al.,
Individual Differences]; Seymour Epstein et al., Irrational Reactions to Negative Outcomes: Evidence for
Two Conceptual Systems, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 328 (1992) [hereinafter Epstein et al.,
Irrational Reactions]; Seymour Epstein et al., The Missing Link in the Paradox of the Linda Conjunc-
tion Problem: Beyond Knowing and Thinking of the Conjunction Rule, The Intrinsic Appeal of Heuristic
Processing, 25 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 204 (1999) [hereinafter Epstein et al., The
Missing Link]; Lee A. Kirkpatrick & Seymour Epstein, Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory and Subjec-
tive Probability: Further Evidence for Two Conceptual Systems, 63 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
534 (1992); Rosemary Pacini & Seymour Epstein, The Relation of Rational and Experiential Informa-
tion Processing Styles to Personality, Basic Beliefs, and the Ratio-Bias Phenomenon, 76 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 972 (1999).
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research on Dual Process Theories in social psychology.166  Epstein’s approach,
which he calls Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory (“CEST”),167 is particularly
appropriate in this context because of the insight it may provide about the
nature of scientific and experience-based expert opinion.
According to CEST, individuals have two systems for processing informa-
tion: a rational system and an experiential system.168  The rational system oper-
ates according to an individual’s understanding of rules of logic and evidence.
An experiential system processes information more simply.  It represents events
as concrete exemplars rather than abstract symbols, is shaped by emotionally
significant past experiences, and is outcome-oriented rather than process-
oriented.169  CEST contrasts the two systems along a number of dimensions.170
Most fundamentally, experiential processing is more holistic, associative, and
concrete, is more crudely differentiated, and is more likely to rely on stereo-
types.171  On the other hand, rational processing is relatively more analytical,
logical, and abstract, and it uses more highly differentiated constructs.172
Responses to the well-known Linda Conjunction Problem reveal the nature
of these differences.173  The problem is named after a vignette first used by
Aaron Tversky and Daniel Kahneman.174  Linda is described as a thirty-one
year-old woman who majored in philosophy in college, where she was actively
involved in issues of social justice.175  In the typical presentation of the vignette,
individuals are asked to rank the probability that Linda is a feminist, a bank
teller, or a feminist and a bank teller, among other alternatives.176  In the original
166. For a set of essays on numerous topics in this area, see DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY (Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999) [hereinafter DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES];
see also Serena Chen & Shelly Chaiken, The Heuristic-systemic Model in its Broader Context, in DUAL-
PROCESS THEORIES, supra, at 73-96; Eliot R. Smith & Jamie DeCoster, Associative and Rule-Based
Processing: A Connectionist Interpretation, in DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES, supra, at 323-36.
167. See Epstein, Implications of CEST, supra note 165.
168. See id.
169. See Kirkpatrick & Epstein, supra note 165, at 534.
170. For a complete list of comparisons between the experiential and rational systems and the ex-
perimental evidence supporting each comparison, see Seymour Epstein & Rosemary Pacini, Some Ba-
sic Issues Regarding Dual-process Theories from the Perspective of Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory,
in DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES, supra note 166, at 466.
171. See id. at 463.
172. Other dual-process models make similar distinctions between these two types of reasoning.
For examples, S.A. Sloman argues that the “associative” system operates reflectively, using knowledge
of similarity relations as well as general knowledge contained in stereotypes.  On the other hand, the
“rule-based” system describes the world by employing a logical, hierarchical, and causal-mechanical
structure.  See Steven A. Sloman, The Empirical Case for Two Systems of Reasoning, 119 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 3, 3-22 (1996).  Chaiken makes similar distinctions between “heuristic” and “systematic” proc-
essing.  See Chen & Chaiken, supra note 166, at 73-96.
173. See Aaron Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Extensional versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunc-
tion Fallacy in Probability Judgment, 90 PSYCHOL. REV. 293,  293-315 (1983).
174. See id.
175. A full version used recently in an experiment by Epstein et al., reads as follows: “Linda is 31
years old, single, outspoken, and very bright.  She majored in philosophy.  As a student, she was deeply
concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demon-
strations.”  Epstein et al., The Missing Link, supra note 165, at 208.
176. See id.
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study, Tversky and Kahneman report that eight-five percent of the respondents
ranked the conjunction (feminist and bank teller) as more probable than the
constituent (bank teller).177
People who commit the conjunction fallacy seem to engage in a type of ho-
listic reasoning that attends to the context in which the problem is presented.178
The extraneous personality information about Linda contributes to the overall
context in which the problem is viewed.179  People who do not commit the con-
junction fallacy process the information by first separating out the personality
information as irrelevant and treating the remainder of the problem as one of
statistical probability.180
This conjunction fallacy has proven to be remarkably robust.181  When peo-
ple are told of the conjunction rule or are given statistical training shortly be-
fore presenting the Linda problem as a group they are much less likely to com-
mit the conjunction fallacy.  Even under these circumstances, however, many
continue to do so.  Apparently, the Linda problem discourages rational proc-
essing by presenting the facts in a context-specific, concrete representation
form.182  By doing so, it engages respondents’ experiential system, which seeks
concrete, context-specific solutions rather than abstract, analytical, context-
general solutions.183
The experiential system frequently integrates concrete, context-specific in-
formation in the form of coherent stories.  For example, several investigators
have commented on the frequency with which subjects spontaneously provide
narrative response to the Linda problem.184  A relatively common narrative re-
sponse justifying the violation of the conjunction rule is that “Linda is more
likely to be a bank teller and a feminist than just a feminist, because she has to
make a living.”185
Not only do experiential and rational systems differ in terms of holism and
concreteness, they also differ at an emotional level.  People are more likely to
engage the experiential system in emotionally charged situations.186  In addition,
when confronted with a problem, they are likely to engage in experiential proc-
essing first.187  For example, in one experiment where individuals were asked to
put themselves in the position of a person “who had an accident when backing
out his car from a space that his friend had selected, many reported that their
first thought was that the accident was the friend’s fault, and that they would
177. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 173, at 299.
178. See Epstein et al., The Missing Link, supra note 165, at 204-14.
179. The effect persists for some even when they are instructed to ignore the extraneous informa-
tion.  See id. at 212.
180. See id.
181. See id. at 204-14.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See Epstein & Pacini, supra note 170, at 469.
185. Id.
186. See id. at 472.
187. See id.
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feel anger toward the friend.  Except for him, I wouldn’t have had the acci-
dent.”188  As they thought about the issue, their thinking became more ra-
tional.189
As this last example suggests, individuals are capable of both experiential
and rational processing.  The Linda problem is notorious in part because it is
relatively immune to appeals to rational processing.  Even here, however, if in-
dividuals are asked to approach the problem from a rational perspective, many
do so.  Other experiments replicate this result.190
One type of processing is not inherently better than the other.  Each has its
place.  Experiential processing has the virtue that it is quick, it is available even
when people are under an emotional load, and, in some situations, it may well
produce better results than can be achieved by rational processing.191  As any
golfer knows, one’s swing rarely, if ever, benefits from a rational, detailed
analysis of the variables that produce a good golf shot.  The same may be said
for other types of performance.  “You’re thinking about it too much” is typical
advice to allow experiential processing to have its way.
For other tasks, however, experiential processing can lead to less accurate
judgments, as the Linda conjunction problem indicates.  In general, experiential
processing is prone to a variety of judgment errors.192  The Linda problem is an
188. Id.
189. See id.
190. In one group of experiments, the researchers present subjects with pairs of short vignettes and
then asked them how they think the protagonist in the vignette would react, how they themselves
would react, and how they would respond if they were giving a “strictly logical response.”  In each pair
of vignettes the protagonist experienced identical outcomes.  With respect to a number of the vignettes,
the key question was how foolish the protagonist (or they) would feel in each situation.  Thus, for ex-
ample, in one study subjects were told the following pair of stories and then asked their opinion about a
sense of foolishness:
Mrs. Crane and Mrs. Tees were scheduled to leave the airport at the same time, but on
different flights . . . . Each of them drove the same distance to the airport, was caught in a traf-
fic jam, and arrived at the airport 30 minutes after the scheduled departure of their flights.
Mrs. Crane was told at her gate that her flight left on time.  Mrs. Tees was told at her gate that
her flight was delayed and had left just three minutes ago.  They both had dawdled for ten
minutes before leaving home.
Epstein et al., Irrational Reactions, supra note 165, at  331-32.
When asked how the protagonists would feel, 81% of the respondents said Mrs. Tees would feel
more foolish, 13% said Mrs. Crane would feel more foolish, and 6% said they would feel equally fool-
ish.  When asked how they would feel, 80% said they would feel more foolish in the Tee’s situation,
10% more foolish in the Crane situation, and 10% said they would feel equally foolish in both situa-
tions.  See id. at 332 tbl. 2.  However, when the subjects were asked “to give a strictly logical response”
and to “decide who actually behaved more foolishly in terms of bringing about the unfortunate event
that occurred,” id. at 332, 25% said Mrs. Tees, 15% said Mrs. Crane, and 63% said there was no differ-
ence.  See id. at 333 tbl. 2.
Epstein explains this effect and similar effects in other vignettes in terms of the associative principle.
People giving experiential responses are more likely to be making an associative connection, that is,
dawdling is a more significant factor in the near-miss situation.  People giving the rational response are
more likely to reflect an awareness that the association of dawdling and lateness is no more significant
in one situation than the other.  See id. at 333.
191. See Epstein et al., The Missing Link, supra note 165, at  213.
192. These errors may be thought of as biases.  Some biases are intentional, such as those that are
the result of fraud or advocacy.  Other biases may be thought of as “hot.”  They are often uninten-
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example of an association error.  A more realistic example comes from a study
by Gilovich in which newspaper sportswriters were asked to rate the potential
of various hypothetical college players to succeed in professional football.193  If
the player was said to have come from the hometown of an established profes-
sional player, he was rated much higher than if he grew up in some other
town.194  A similar error which may occur with experiential processing is called
confirmation bias.195  Hypotheses are tested by exclusively or primarily searching
for events that occur when the hypothesis says they should occur.  For example,
to test whether environmental regulations reduce employment rates, one only
cites jurisdictions with strict regulations and high unemployment, and perhaps
jurisdictions with low unemployment and lax regulations.  When this type of
bias occurs, a hypothesis is more likely to be confirmed than disconfirmed, re-
gardless of whether it was correct.196
2. Factors Influencing Types of Reasoning.  CEST and most other dual
processing theories assume that people apprehend reality by two systems of
information processing, experiential and rational, and that the systems operate
in parallel and interact.197  This does not mean, however, that individuals are
equally likely to engage both systems to the same extent in all situations.  Many
factors may affect the tendency to process information one way or the other,
including the psychological characteristics of the individual, whether the
decision is about a general trend or a specific event, and the normal way
information is processed within an area of expertise.
Dual process theories have grown up within the discipline of psychology.
As a result, a fair amount of effort has been devoted to studying psychological
characteristics and predispositions that may cause one to be more or less likely
to engage in experiential or rational processing.  For example, Epstein and his
colleagues gave a group of subjects two inventory scales.198  One, called the
tional, and even unconscious, but they are directionally motivated because the individual expects or
wants an outcome to prevail.  Still other biases are “cold.”  They occur even in the absence of a desire
for a certain outcome and in spite of a desire to achieve accuracy.  See Robert J. MacCoun, Biases in the
Interpretation and Use of Research Results, 49 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 259, 268 (1998). The Linda con-
junction problem may often be a “cold” bias.
193. See Thomas Gilovich, Seeing the Past in the Present: The Effect of Associations to Familiar
Events on Judgements and Decisions, 40 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 797, 798-801 (1981).
194. See id.  Another bias that is frequently discussed in legal literature is the hindsight bias.  In
hindsight, we tend to exaggerate the likelihood that we would have been able to predict the event be-
forehand.  Most discussions of this bias have to do with jury decisionmaking.  See Reid Hastie et al.,
Jury Judgments in Civil Cases: Hindsight Effects on Judgments of Liability for Punitive Damages, 23
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 597 (1999); Susan J. LaBine & Gary LaBine, Determinations of Negligence and
the Hindsight Bias, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 501 (1996); Kim A. Kamin & Jeffery J. Rachlinski, Ex
Post ≠ Ex Ante: Determining Liability in Hindsight, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89 (1995); see also Carroll
v. Otis Elevator Co., 896 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1990).
195. See generally Joshua Klayman & Young-Won Ha, Confirmation, Disconfirmation, and Infor-
mation in Hypothesis Testing,  94 PSYCHOL. REV. 211 (1987).
196. See MacCoun, supra note 192, at 269.  Arguably, the plaintiff’s expert’s investigation in Kumho
suffered from this bias.  See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 151 (1999).
197. See Epstein & Pacini, supra note 170, at 462.
198. See Epstein et al., Individual Differences, supra note 165, at 394.
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“Need For Cognition” scale, includes items such as “thinking is not my idea of
fun,” and “I would prefer complex to simple problems.”199  The second scale,
called “Faith In Intuition,” includes items such as “I believe I can judge charac-
ter pretty well from a person’s appearance” and “I believe in trusting my
hunches.”200  People who score high on the Need for Cognition scale were more
likely to provide rational responses to vignettes such as the one discussed in
note 190.201  Those who scored high on the Faith in Intuition scale were more
likely to give heuristic (associational) responses.202  However, this effect oc-
curred only when the subjects were asked how they would respond if put in the
position of the protagonist in the vignette.  The effects largely disappeared
when they were asked to assess the situation from a logical perspective.203  Al-
though people with different psychological makeups differ in their initial re-
sponse to problems, they are also able to vary their approach according to the
perspective they are asked to adopt.204
It is a commonplace observation that people often respond differently to
specific incidents than they do to general situations.  For example, people will
devote enormous energy to rescue a specific individual or save a specific life,
but will devote less energy to rescue or save an abstract life.205  Or, in a different
context, a surgeon may be willing to accept a failure rate of ten percent for a
difficult operation and yet feel anger or guilt in the face of a particular failure.206
Similarly, in a less serious context, a basketball coach might gladly accept a
turnover rate of seven per game prior to the season, but when a particular turn-
over occurs, he may react very negatively.207  The difference is also reflected in
the confidence we have in our judgments.  People generally overestimate the
correctness of their judgments.208  However, this phenomenon appears to occur
only when people are asked to assess specific judgments.  When asked about
their ability on a general task, if they err in any direction, they tend to be under-
confident.209
CEST offers one way of understanding these results.  Specific cases are
more likely to arouse a response from the heart on the basis of emotion and gut
feelings.210  In this context, individuals are more likely to engage in experiential
199. Id.
200. Id.; see also Pacini & Epstein, supra note 165, at 976.




205. See Steven J. Sherman et al., Dual-Processing Accounts of Inconsistencies in Responses to Gen-
eral versus Specific Cases, in DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES, supra note 165, at 203, 204; see also GUIDO
CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES AND THE LAW: PRIVATE LAW PERSPECTIVE ON A
PUBLIC LAW PROBLEM (1985) (reflecting on this difference).
206. See Sherman, supra note 205, at 210.
207. See id. at 204-05.
208. See id. at 205.
209. See id.
210. See id. at 221.
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processing.  Because this type of processing is associative, narrative, and based
on stereotypes, it may not fully consider the evidence supporting rival explana-
tions for a situation.  Confirmation bias, discussed above, offers a similar expla-
nation for this effect.211  This overconfidence result is relevant in the context of
expert testimony concerning specific events.  Doctors expressing an opinion
about whether a substance has caused an injury in a particular individual may
be overconfident in their differential diagnosis if they have engaged in experien-
tial processing.212
Because of the origins of dual process theories, far less research has gone
into studying sociological factors that might influence judgments.  It would
seem that disciplinary cultures would influence the type of processing that oc-
curs.  Popperian falsification via the modus tollens syllogism:  “If p then q: not q;
therefore, not p,” is one such cultural value.213  Other disciplines may not have a
commitment to such values, and, indeed, may place greater emphasis on intui-
tion, holistic views, and narrative.214
Professional training attempts to instill these values in new entrants.  There
is relatively little information on the success of such efforts.  One exception is a
study that examined the effects of graduate training in law, medicine, psychol-
ogy, and chemistry on the ability of students correctly to solve questions in-
volving verbal reasoning, statistical and methodological reasoning, and condi-
tional reasoning.215  When they entered graduate school, there were no
differences between disciplines in reasoning, except for verbal reasoning, where
first-year law students did slightly better.216  At the beginning of the third year,
there were interesting differences.217  All groups improved in their verbal rea-
soning, and all but the chemistry students improved in their conditional rea-
211. See Yakov Trope & Ruth Gaunt, A Dual-Process Model of Overconfident Attributional Infer-
ences, in DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES, supra note 165, at 161 (distinguishing between “diagnostic” and
“pseudo-diagnostic” hypothesis evaluation).  Diagnostic evaluation is an orderly and systematic
method for assessing the validity of a diagnostic hypothesis that takes into account base-rate informa-
tion, the accuracy of the immediate symptoms or behaviors, and their diagnostic value regarding the
causal hypothesis.  See id. at 163.
212. Clinicians are not unaware of this danger.  See, for example, Paul Meehl’s valuable discussion
of  ways of processing information in the context of psychological diagnosis.  He poses a key question
for all clinicians: “When shall we use our heads instead of the formula?” PAUL E. MEEHL,
PSYCHODIAGNOSIS: SELECTED PAPERS 81 (1973).
213. See MacCoun, supra note 192, at 269.
214. See generally CATHERINE KOHLER RIESSMAN, NARRATIVE ANALYSIS (Qualitative Research
Methods No. 30, 1993).
215. See Darrin R. Lehman et al., The Effects of Graduate Training on Reasoning: Formal Discipline
and Thinking About Everyday-Life Events, 49 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 431 (1988).
216. See id. at 437.  First-year chemistry students did not do as well, but this could have been attrib-
uted, in part, to the low initial GRE scores for many of the students.  When the students who dropped
out of the program during the first two years were excluded from the analysis, entering scores of chem-
istry graduate students were similar to the students in other disciplines.  See id.
217. The researcher employed both a cross-sectional and a longitudinal design.  At the time they
tested the first-year students, they also tested students beginning their third year.  Two years later, they
retested the first-year students as they entered their third year.  The results of the two analyses were
quite similar.  See id. at 437-38.
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soning.218  Most dramatic, however, were the students’ improvements in statisti-
cal and methodological reasoning.  Here, the medical, and especially the psy-
chology, students did much better than students in law and chemistry.219  The re-
searchers then related these results to the curricular content of the first two
years of each course of study.220  The variables examined in this study are not
identical to those examined in much of the dual process literature, but the re-
sults lend support to the idea that disciplines may have some success in training
their practitioners to process information in a more rational or a more experien-
tial manner.
Differences also exist in the procedures disciplines establish to assess and
control errors.  Arguably, peer review, the use of expert panels, replication of
prior research findings, and meta-analysis (combining the results of a number of
studies into one analysis) are all organizational attempts to impose rational
processing on a field.  These institutional arrangements do not guarantee cor-
rect results,221 but they establish a standard of practice for a community of indi-
viduals.  Whether members of the community will abide by the standards de-
pends in part on the autonomy of the expert’s community.  Communities of
professionals with high levels of reputational autonomy proceed self-
referentially.  The relevant scientific or technical organization is the primary, if
not the sole, source of recognition and reputation.222  Members of such groups
may be reluctant to assess data or adopt positions in a way that is contrary to
the canons of their field. When the field, in turn, values norms of objective,
disinterested, and skeptical examination of data, its members may be less prone
to violate these norms in the service of an advocate.  On the other hand, when
the group is low on reputational autonomy or when the professional norms of
the community do not value objectivity and disinterestedness, there may be less
incentive for an expert to resist the adversarial role.  However, no field is im-
mune from these pressures, and as Patterson notes, “[w]orking scientists can
218. See id. at 438.
219. Law and chemistry student scores improved less than 10%, medical student scores improved
somewhere between 20 and 30%, and psychology student scores improved nearly 70%.  See id.
220. See id. at 438-39.
221. Even where there is a commitment to replication, in practice it is very difficult to achieve
agreement that a hypothesis has in fact been falsified, and alternative testing strategies have been pro-
posed.  See MacCoun, supra note 192, at 276.  Peer review is premised in part on the idea that groups of
individuals will make fewer errors than any given individual.  Again, however, this is not inevitable.
The likelihood that group decisionmaking will correct individual biases depends on such things as the
strength of individual bias and the degree to which a normative framework for recognizing and cor-
recting the bias is shared by group members.  See id. at 279.  A set of fascinating articles has explored
this and other issues concerning procedures used in the handwriting area. See Andre A. Moenssens,
Handwriting Identification Evidence in the Post-Daubert World, 66 UMKC L. REV. 251 (1997); D. Mi-
chael Risinger et al., Brave New “Post-Daubert World”—A Reply to Professor Moenssens, 29 SETON
HALL L. REV. 405 (1998); D. Michael Risinger et al., Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational
Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting Identification “Expertise,” 137 U. PA. L. REV. 731 (1989); D.
Michael Risinger & Michael J. Saks, Science and Nonscience in the Courts: Daubert Meets Handwriting
Identification Expertise, 82 IOWA L. REV. 21 (1996); Saks, supra note 50.
222. See STEPHAN FUCHS, THE PROFESSIONAL QUEST FOR THE TRUTH: A SOCIAL THEORY OF
SCIENCE AND KNOWLEDGE 182 (1992).
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and do readily identify peers whom they regard as having become advocates, no
longer capable of reading evidence in an even-handed way.”223
These cautions aside, it seems fair to conclude that disciplines and areas of
knowledge are more or less committed to rational processing, and courts are
likely to be confronted with experts using both rational and experiential types
of problem solving.224  The beekeeper’s assertion that it is his experience that
bees always take off into the wind may be based on some type of experiential
reasoning.  Likewise, the harbor pilot’s knowledge of the channel may be based
on a holistic assessment of the situation based in part on his stereotypes of the
harbor’s bottom.  Handwriting experts might purport to have similar capabili-
ties—a certain ability to see a larger picture even as they are hard pressed to de-
scribe in detail exactly how they came to their judgment.225  If so, their testimony
has similarities with that of the plaintiff’s expert in Kumho, who relied on his
subjective judgment to determine that the pattern of tire wear he observed was
not consistent with overdeflection.
3. Summary.  Four conclusions should be drawn from this body of research.
First, there appears to be a type of reasoning that can fairly be called
experiential.  Moreover, we can say more about experiential reasoning than that
it is based on experience.  It is a type of problem solving that is efficient,
holistic, based on typical associations, and often is invoked when a decision
must be made quickly or when individual judgment is affected by emotion.
Often, it provides a fully sufficient understanding of a situation, but sometimes,
as in the Linda Conjunction Problem, it results in judgments contrary to those
that are reached by what the dual process theorists call rational processing.
Here, I must offer an important caveat.  The psychological literature pro-
vides a specific meaning to the idea of experiential information processing.  I
argue that this is one plausible definition of experience-based testimony.  Some
may disagree.  If so, they might argue that experience witnesses somehow proc-
ess information in a way that is not captured by either rational or experiential
processing.  This may be so, but if it is, I believe it is incumbent on those who
take this view to explain this third way of understanding.  Alternatively, they
might argue that much experience-based expertise is reached by a process of ra-
tional, not experiential, processing.  Insofar as this is the case, it supports the
223. Patterson, supra note 148, at 1334 (alteration in original) (quoting Eliot Marshall, When Does
Intellectual Passion Become Conflict of Interest?, 257 SCIENCE, NEW SERIES 620 (1992)); see also
MARK A. CHESLER ET AL., SOCIAL SCIENCE IN COURT: MOBILIZING EXPERTS IN THE SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION CASES 120-28 (1988) (discussing experts who self-report that they adopted legal-
adversarial norms when testifying in school desegregation cases).
224. The post-modern turn in many fields ensures that some experts will believe that a narrative,
subjective, contextual understanding is to be preferred to arguments premised on the idea that objec-
tive knowledge of the world is possible.  See THE INTERPRETIVE TURN: PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE,
CULTURE (David R. Hiley et al. eds., 1991); POSTMODERNISM AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (Joe Do-
herty et al. eds., 1992).
225. See Risinger & Saks, supra note 221, at 73.
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argument presented in Part IV infra that courts should adopt admissibility crite-
ria that are premised on rational processing for all types of expertise.
A second conclusion from the preceding discussion is that people are more
likely to engage in experiential reasoning when assessing specific instances than
when assessing general cases.  When they do so, they are likely to be over-confi-
dent in their judgments.
Third, areas of expertise seem to differ in their level of commitment to ra-
tional processing.  Disciplines vary in the way they train new members, in their
norms concerning good research, and in the institutionalized procedures they
employ to assess each other’s work.  This does not mean that every expert
opinion reflects the norms of the expert’s discipline.  Both rational and experi-
ential processing are, in a sense, ideal types.  No real world expert opinion per-
fectly exemplifies either.  Not infrequently, experts may go against type, with
the “scientist” offering an experiential judgment and the “non-scientist” offer-
ing a rational judgment.
This leads us to a fourth conclusion:  People are not divided into two groups,
experiential system processors and rational system processors.  Everybody does
both, and not only do they do both, they often do both simultaneously, albeit in
different proportions.  Everyday judgments by ordinary people may employ
many of the rational processes we routinely attribute to scientists.  On the other
hand, people who hold themselves out to be experts sometimes may arrive at
professional opinions based in large part on experiential processing.  If the
above is correct, how should courts respond to expert opinion based on experi-
ence?  How should they assess the admissibility of pilots and beekeepers and
others?  These questions are considered in the next Part.
IV
CHOOSING ADMISSIBILITY CRITERIA
The preceding analysis challenges the commonly held belief that there is a
bright line between scientific and non-scientific knowledge, and that disciplines
and their experts may be easily pigeonholed into one of these two categories.  If
this analysis is correct, I believe it helps us to understand why it has been so dif-
ficult to list a set of admissibility criteria for non-scientific experts.
Prior to Daubert, courts exhibited a laissez-faire attitude toward the reli-
ability of the testimony of non-scientific experts.226  In the years following Dau-
bert, the courts appear to have been less lenient, but there are still no well-
defined objective reliability standards for experience testimony.  In a very help-
ful article on admissibility criteria for non-scientific experts written not long af-
ter the decision in Daubert, Professor Imwinkelried opines that perhaps the rea-
226. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Next Step After Daubert: Developing a Similarly Epistemo-
logical Approach to Ensuring the Relaibility of Nonscientific Expert Testimony, 15 CARDOZO L. REV.
2271, 2281 (1994).
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son that courts have not formulated such standards is that it cannot be done.227  I
think that this observation is not far from the mark.
In his article, Imwinkelried suggests two broad criteria that might be used to
assess such experience testimony: quantitative restrictions and qualitative re-
strictions.228  As I read these criteria, however, they are not substantially differ-
ent from parts of the Daubert test.  The quantitative restriction would prohibit
opinion testimony based on no experience or on very limited experience, that is,
based on very few instances where the expert has observed the phenomenon in
question.229  This restriction reflects a concern that experts sometimes fail to un-
derstand the law of large numbers.230  One flip of a coin cannot tell us whether
the coin is biased.  Watching five bees take off offers little support for the
proposition that bees always take off into the wind.  In Daubert terminology,
the issue usually is one of error rate.231  Although experts who engage in experi-
ential reasoning may be more prone to this threat to reliability, the requirement
that one’s judgment be based upon a sufficient number of observations should
be applicable to scientific and non-scientific judgments alike.
Imwinkelried’s qualitative restriction examples involve the question of
“fit.”232  Thus, he concludes by noting that “the trial judge should be empowered
to exclude nonscientific expert opinion when the underlying experiences are
dissimilar” to the question in the case.233  Again, this concern should apply
equally to experiential and scientific expertise.
In another helpful piece written after Kumho, Imwinkelried revisited this
question.234  In this article, he proposes two other factors courts might consider
when assessing the admissibility of what he calls “nonscientific” expert testi-
mony: (1) proof that the expert’s decision making ability is superior to that of
lay persons, and (2) proof of extensive third-party reliance.235
As an example of an application of the first factor, Imwinkelried cites the
trial judge’s determination in United States v. Starzecpyzel,236 that questioned
document examination does not qualify as “scientific knowledge.”237  Neverthe-
less, the trial judge permitted the state’s experts to testify because of evidence
from one study that document examiners might make fewer errors than lay
people.238  Three things are worth noting about this example.  First, the criterion
used to judge whether the expert is more qualified than a lay person is the Dau-
227. See id. at 2283.
228. See id. at 2290-94.
229. See id. at 2291.
230. See HUBERT M. BLALOCK, SOCIAL STATISTICS 138 (1960).
231. See Lehman, supra note 215, at 435.
232. See Imwinkelried, supra note 226, at 2293.
233. Id. at 2293.
234. Imwinkelried, supra note 134.
235. Id. at 32-34.
236. 880 F. Supp. 1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
237. See id. at 1029.
238. See id.; see also United States v. Velasquez, 64 F.3d 844 (3d Cir. 1995).
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bert criterion of error rate.  Second, the evidence required to make this deter-
mination is the type used to judge the reliability of scientific evidence: method-
ologically sound, falsifiable research.239  Third, there is an implicit premise in
Starzecpyzel that even if non-scientific testimony should be assessed in terms of
error rate and falsifiability, the threshold for admissibility is lower; that is, the
error rate may be higher and the research supporting the expert’s testimony
may be of lesser quality.240  Whatever pre-Kumho support there may have been
for this position, it seems to have received little support in subsequent opin-
ions.241
The second factor, extensive third-party reliance, is a useful criterion.  As
Faigman, Porter, and Saks note,242 in the nineteenth and early twentieth century,
almost all experts sold their expertise in a marketplace other than the court-
room, and this marketplace determined whether valid knowledge existed by
endowing it with commercial value.243  One should note, however, that this is a
surrogate index of reliability, similar to peer review, publication, and general
acceptance.  Sole reliance on this factor would constitute a return to a Frye-like
rule for assessing admissibility.244  None of the above is meant to be a criticism of
Imwinkelried’s useful and sensible discussions; rather, it is intended to indicate
how difficult it is to articulate objective admissibility criteria that apply uniquely
to experience testimony.
The dual process theory research suggests that we are faced with a funda-
mental choice.  We could develop admissibility criteria that actually reflect the
reality of experiential system judgments; that is, criteria that would acknowl-
edge their holistic, narrative, associational, and, to some extent, subjective na-
ture.245  Such judicial decisions would themselves be rather subjective in nature.
239. Professor Imwinkelried cites such research as the type of information one would wish to have
to assess whether the expert’s decisionmaking ability is superior to that of a lay person.  See Imwinkel-
ried,  supra note 134, at 33.
240. See Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. at 1029.
241. As noted earlier, in the aftermath of Kumho Tire, the district court in United States v. Hines, 55
F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. Mass. 1999), refused to allow the government’s handwriting expert to testify that the
defendant was the author of a note used in a bank robbery.  See also United States v. VanWyk, 83 F.
Supp. 2d 515, 523-24 (D.N.J. 2000) (Expert in forensic stylistics could not testify in prosecution for
making threatening communications as to identity of unknown writings, due to lack of scientific reli-
ability of forensic stylistics; there was no known rate of error, no recognized standard, no meaningful
peer review, and no system of accrediting individual as expert in field.).
242. See Faigman et al., supra note 14.
243. See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 2-3.
244. I might add that third-party reliance, like general acceptance, is more useful in determining
whether a general method is reliable than it is in determining whether a particular application of the
method is admissible.  As the court in Kumho noted, the difficulty with Dr. Carlson’s testimony is not
that his visual inspection method is generally unreliable.  Rather, it is his application of the method in a
particular case that is questionable.  See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 151 (1999).  The
fact that third parties rely on visual inspection to determine the cause of tire failure is of limited assis-
tance in addressing questions of specific causation.
245. These decisions are subjective in the sense that the bases of such judgments are not easily ar-
ticulated in terms of a clear systematic set of decision rules others could follow to see if they arrive at
the same result.  In a sense, the very effort to do so begins to move the judgment away from the experi-
ential system and toward more rational processing.
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The alternative is to use a set of objective factors that, when examined closely,
would be similar for both scientific and experiential evidence and would require
experts to present a rational system analysis of the issues in the case.  I support
the latter course.
A disadvantage of the objective factors alternative is that it is difficult to de-
fine a legally acceptable subjective test.  Daubert and Kumho prohibit the most
obvious alternatives.  For example, they would not permit experiential experts
to testify based solely on a showing that they are qualified, that is, that they
have experience in the relevant area, be it beekeeping, piloting, or engineering.
Likewise, I believe that these cases bar a return to a Frye-like test for experien-
tial testimony, for example, that amongst beekeepers it is generally accepted
that bumblebees take off into the wind.246  Even if this were not the case, the
Frye test itself may prove to be too restrictive.  In Logerquist v. McVey,247 the
trial court excluded the testimony of experts proffered to testify as to plaintiff’s
repressed memory that her pediatrician molested her two decades earlier.  Ari-
zona has not adopted Daubert, and the trial court excluded the testimony on
Frye grounds.248  The Arizona Supreme Court reversed:
Opinion testimony on human behavior is admissible when relevant to an issue in the
case, when such testimony will aid in understanding evidence outside the experience
or knowledge of the average juror, and when the witness is qualified, as Ariz.R.Evid.
702 requires, by “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.”  To put it sim-
ply, Frye is inapplicable when a qualified witness offers relevant testimony or conclu-
sions based on experience and observation about human behavior for the purpose of
explaining that behavior.249
It appears Arizona’s solution to “experience evidence,” at least in those situa-
tions where the expert is not providing specific causation evidence,250 is to re-
treat from any reliability criteria.
Even were we able to craft acceptable admissibility criteria that reflect the
nature of experiential knowledge, I believe that the epistemological needs of
the legal system argue for tests that push experts toward rational processing jus-
tifications of their position.  The next section discusses those epistemological
needs.
A. Epistemological Needs of the Legal System
Adjective law regulates claims about the world.  The rules of evidence and
procedure that perform this task are the law’s epistemology.  They are “the set
246. On its face, Kumho does not prohibit this approach.  A trial judge might conclude, for example,
that of the four Daubert factors, only general acceptance is an appropriate measure of reliability in a
given case and that no alternative factors are appropriate.  In my opinion, this would rarely be an ac-
ceptable resolution after Kumho.  It is difficult to imagine a situation where the only affirmative thing
one could say of proffered testimony is that others in the field are in agreement.  When this is the case,
the Kumho opinion suggests that the testimony is inadmissible.  See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 151.
247. 1 P.3d 113 (Ariz. 2000).
248. See id. at 118.
249. Id. at 123.
250. The Logerquist court would not permit the expert to express an opinion on the alleged victim’s
credibility or the truth of allegations of sexual abuse or rape.  See id.
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of rules and institutions that determine what can be believed with sufficient jus-
tification for the purposes of the legal system.”251  The choice of admissibility cri-
teria for expert evidence should attend not only to the nature of the evidence,
but also to the epistemological needs of the legal system.  As Professor Leiter
observes, the answer to the question of how scientists arrive at truth does not
necessarily provide an answer to the lawyer’s question of what criteria judges
should use in deciding the admissibility of scientific evidence.252  We should not
prefer an approach to assessing reliability simply because “that’s the way scien-
tists do it” or “that’s the way experience witnesses do it.”253  Admissibility rules
do not tell scientists and non-scientists how to proceed.  The rules are for the
courts.254  In my opinion, three facts about courts argue for using admissibility
rules that push all witnesses toward rational processing: the adversarial nature
of U.S. trials, the nature of jury decisionmaking, and the capabilities of trial
court judges.255
1. Adversarial Trials.  Admissibility rules are formulated against the back-
drop of the adversarial nature of U.S. trials.  In inquisitorial systems in coun-
tries such as Belgium, France, Germany, and Japan, the judge plays a large role
in the production of evidence.256  Experts are almost always court-appointed and
are asked to submit written reports.257  Parties may be given the opportunity to
object to a particular expert, question the expert about the opinion rendered, or
hire their own expert to rebut the court-appointed expert; however, the process
is relatively non-adversarial.258  By way of contrast, our system is one in which
the parties generally select, prepare, and present experts.  Court-appointed ex-
perts are rare.259  Thus it is more likely that experts will come to the stand with
“hot biases.”260  Such biases are not necessarily intentional, but they are direc-
tionally motivated.261  The experts are more likely to want a certain outcome to
251. See Brewer, supra note 15, at 1540-41.
252. See Leiter, supra note 135, at 805, 812-13.
253. Id. at 813.
254. See id.
255. I do not mean to preclude the consideration of other factors.  I do, however, believe that these
three are crucial.  See Joseph Sanders, Scientifically Complex Cases, Trial by Jury, and the Erosion of
Adversarial Processes, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 355 (1998).
256. See generally CAROL A.G. JONES, EXPERT WITNESSES: SCIENCE, MEDICINE, AND THE
PRACTICE OF LAW  51-52 (1994); John Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U.
CHI. L. REV. 823 (1985).
257. See Jones, supra note 256, at 51-52; Langbein, supra note 256, at 824.
258. See Langbein, supra note 256, at 824.
259. See Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Court Appointed Experts, in FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 535 (1994).
260. See MacCoun, supra note 192, at 268.
261. See id.
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prevail.262  Justice Breyer expressed this concern with respect to the plaintiff’s
expert’s testimony in Kumho.263
These “hot biases” may, in turn, increase the likelihood of “cold biases.”264
Indeed, the two may merge together to form what MacCoun describes as
“warm” biases, influenced by motivation as well as by cognition.265  These biases
are difficult to detect in any case, but especially so when the expert offers only a
holistic, summary judgment without a detailed discussion of the factors that
produce the judgment. The use of objective, rational admissibility criteria in-
creases the likelihood that unreliable opinion will be excluded.266
2. Jury Decisionmaking.  Leiter argues that many admissibility rules are
epistemically paternalistic:
Epistemic paternalism substitutes the rulemaker’s judgment about what is epis-
temically best for agents for their own judgment.  Assuming that the primary epis-
temic value is truth, epistemic paternalism entails designing rules of evidence that are
epistemically best for jurors, i.e. that lead them to form true beliefs about disputed
matters of fact.267
Mirjan Damaska argues that this type of paternalism is a noticeable feature of
the American law of evidence.  One of the unique aspects of U.S. evidence law
is its complex web of exclusionary rules, especially those “intrinsic exclusionary
rules” that reject probative information on the belief that its exclusion will in-
crease fact-finding accuracy.268
262. See id.
263. “Indeed, no one has argued that Carlson himself, were he still working for Michelin, would
have concluded in a report to his employer that a similar tire was similarly defective on ground-
sidentical to those upon which he rested his conclusion here.”  Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,
526 U.S. 137, 157 (1999) (citing General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146).
264. See MacCoun, supra note 192, at 268.
265. See id.
266. See, e.g., Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1404-05 (D. Or. 1996).  Here, the
district court ultimately excluded the testimony of an epidemiological expert who, at an initial admissi-
bility hearing, stated that he was not willing to testify, based on the then-existing 16 epidemiological
studies, that silicone implants more likely than not could cause systemic autoimmune disease in women.
See id. at 1404.  However, later, with the release of one additional abstract of an unpublished epidemi-
ological study, the expert reported that he was prepared to change his testimony and say that it is more
likely than not that implants cause systemic autoimmune disease.  See id. at 1405.  The abstract itself
reports that it included only three women with implants and the authors of the abstract reached a dif-
ferent conclusion than the expert.  See id.  The judge’s response to this change of position was perhaps
predictable.  He said in a footnote, “I find this change in so-called ‘scientific opinion’ not only suspect
but shocking, with no scientific basis to support it.  This is exactly the type of ‘junk science’ that the Su-
preme Court in Daubert I commanded courts to exclude.”  Id. at 1405 n.39.  It is not my point to argue
whether this expert’s testimony should be admitted, but only to note that had the expert been asked
simply to present a summary opinion about the relationship of silicone implants and autoimmune dis-
ease, it would have been much more difficult to assess his potential bias.
267. Leiter, supra note 135, at 814.
268. MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT (1997).  For a discussion of two such rules,
see Samuel R. Gross, Make-Believe: The Rules Excluding Evidence of Character and Liability Insur-
ance, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 843 (1998).  For an experiment on the effect of withholding some types of in-
formation on jury decisionmaking, see Shari Seidman Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding
the Jury to Verdict Consequences: Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513
(1992).
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The paternalistic nature of Rule 702 has often been a source of criticism.
Here, I do not wish to review the arguments for and against this type of pater-
nalism.  I note only that this is a well-entrenched part of our law of evidence
and that, given this premise, a factor to be considered when choosing admissi-
bility rules is whether they mitigate jury decisionmaking weaknesses.  What is
the nature of these weaknesses?  Two bodies of research give us some insight
into this question.  First, there is research examining when juries are likely to
engage in central or peripheral processing.269  In central or systematic process-
ing, people examine the content of a communication to assess its validity.270  Per-
suasion is primarily a function of the quality of the arguments presented.271  On
the other hand, in peripheral or heuristic processing, people do not attend to
the quality and validity of arguments.272  Rather, they adopt shortcuts to deter-
mine the value of a message.  People rely on factors such as the number of ar-
guments (rather than their quality), the attractiveness of the communicator, and
the communicator’s credentials. When confronted with complex cases, jurors
are more likely to engage in peripheral or heuristic processing rather than in
systematic or central processing.273
Second, there is a large body of research on the “story model” of jury deci-
sionmaking.  The “story model” argues that jurors try to understand the evi-
dence by constructing a story.274  Under this model, jury deliberations are best
understood as a matching process whereby the jury imposes a narrative story
organization on trial evidence and then compares alternative stories to verdict
categories.275  That is, the jury constructs a story and then matches it against a
number of possible legal outcomes, such as first degree homicide, manslaughter,
self-defense, etc.  The tort analogy to the Pennington and Hastie criminal trial is
a choice among the following possible outcomes: not responsible, strictly liable
for a defective product, negligent, and grossly negligent (liable for punitive
damages).276 As Dan Simon observes, the “story model does not explicate the
269. See Joel Cooper et al., Complex Scientific Testimony: How Do Jurors Make Decisions?, 20 LAW




273. See id. at 390.
274. See Reid Hastie, The Role of “Stories” in Civil Jury Judgments, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 227
(1999); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story
Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519 (1991) [hereinafter Pennington & Hastie, The Story Model]; Nancy
Pennington & Reid Hastie, Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision Making, 51 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 242 (1986); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explaining the Evidence: Tests of the
Story Model for Juror Decision Making, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 189 (1992); see also W.
LANCE W. BENNET & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE COURTROOM:
JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1981); James Holstein, Jurors’ Interpretations and
Jury Decisionmaking, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 83 (1985).
275. See Pennington & Hastie, Explaining the Evidence, supra note 274, at 191; Pennington &
Hastie, The Story Model, supra note 274, at 532.
276. See Hastie, supra note 274.
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cognitive processes on which it is based, though it is apparent that it is driven by
the holistic processes.”277
Both of these bodies of research suggest that jurors themselves frequently
adopt a more experiential type of processing; this may be more likely when the
jury is confronted with complex questions.278  Lawyers’ tactics often enhance the
probability that information will be processed this way by making emotional
appeals. 279  Some of Epstein’s research indicates that experiential processing is
more prevalent under conditions of higher rather than lower emotional inten-
sity.280
This type of common sense reasoning does not necessarily lead to inferior
decisions, and in any case, it is difficult to imagine how to prevent jurors from
engaging in behaviors such as “story model” reasoning.281  The task, therefore, is
to assist the fact finder as much as possible to arrive at the best possible result.
I believe that jurors are more likely to arrive at correct outcomes if the inputs in
their analysis are not themselves holistic accounts.  If experts are required to of-
fer rational processing justifications for their opinions, examination and cross-
examination of experts may focus on the components of the expert argument.
If these components are available for the jury to assess, they may be less likely
to err in their own judgment.  My argument is that experiential system judg-
ments made by juries are less likely to be in error if they are not constructed
from the raw material of earlier experiential judgments by experts.282
3. Judicial Competence.  The question of judicial competence has been at
the heart of a number of critiques of the movement from Frye to Daubert.  It is
said that judges will attempt to evade the gatekeeping task set out by Daubert,
or that they will do it badly.283  Leiter generally favors the movement away from
the Frye test, but he notes that although Daubert may offer a “more scientific
approach to admissibility,” it also threatens to violate the “ought implies can”
principle.284  He is worried that the judiciary is not prepared to perform the
reliability gatekeeping role required of them by Daubert.285  Perhaps the point
277. Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision Making, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 30 (1998).
For a similar assessment, see William Twining, Narrative and Generalizations in Argumentation About
Questions of Fact, 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 351, 355 (1999).
278. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in
Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51  VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998).
279. See Epstein & Pacini, supra note 170, at 470.
280. See id.
281. See Norman J. Finkel, Commonsense Justice, Psychology, and the Law: Prototypes that are
Common, Senseful, and Not, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 461 (1997).
282. Unfortunately, I am not aware of any empirical work supporting this assertion.  However,
Twining notes a number of ways in which holistic reasoning can lead to errors.  They include sneaking
in irrelevant facts; sneaking in invented or ungrounded facts; suggesting facts by innuendo; appealing to
hidden prejudices or stereotypes; making use of dubious analogies; and using good stories to push out
true stories.  See generally Twining, supra note 277.
283. See Erica Beecher-Monas, Blinded by Science: How Judges Avoid the Science in Scientific Evi-
dence, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 55 (1998).
284. Leiter, supra note 135, at 815.
285. See id.
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has some merit, although there is scant evidence that judges performed their
role under Frye with any great distinction.  Nevertheless, we should be
concerned if Kumho requires the trial judge to craft a different set of
admissibility criteria for each type of expertise.
Here, I have two related concerns.  The first is that any dual test will be very
difficult to administer.  Just as there is no sharp line between scientific experts
and other experts, there is no bright line between rational and experiential rea-
soning.  Indeed, the line is even more vague, for it is possible for us to use either
type of reasoning for any problem.  The second concern is that some members
of the judiciary who are already restive under the demands of Daubert might
use a separate test to sidestep the gatekeeping duty entirely.  The Eleventh Cir-
cuit’s Carmichael opinion suggests this possibility by its comment that if Dr.
Carlson’s testimony were based solely on his personal experience and skill with
failed tires, a Daubert analysis would rarely be appropriate.286  Rather, the jury
should be permitted to hear and evaluate the testimony.287
I believe it would be better to understand Kumho as requiring judges to as-
sess non-scientific testimony in, as nearly as possible, the same way that they
currently assess scientific testimony.  The judicial task will be made more man-
ageable if in both scientific and non-scientific testimony, the courts assess the
expert’s reasoning from an objective, rational processing perspective with a sin-
gle test that will lessen the likelihood that a judge will abdicate the gatekeeping
role.
B. The Contours of the Test
Practically, what does this mean?  How should a court proceed with the as-
sessment of admissibility of non-science experts?  The short answer is: as simi-
larly to the method by which they assess scientific experts as is practicable.  This
means that for all types of experts, the court should focus on the first Daubert
criterion.288  This criterion has at its core a concern with methodology.  It asks
the expert to describe objectively the way in which the hypothesis at issue can
be tested and how the expert put the hypothesis to the test.  No doubt, philoso-
phers of science may object to the possibility of conducting crucial experiments
that test grand theories, but in the quotidian questions experts are asked to ad-
dress in court, what is required is relatively easy to envision.  The hypothetical
beekeeper in Berry offers a good example.
286. Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc, 131 F.3d 1433, 1436 (11th Cir. 1997).
287. See id.
288. See Black v. Food Lion, Inc., 171 F.3d 308, 311-12 (5th Cir. 1999).
Kumho Tire thus does not require district courts to reinvent the wheel every time
expert testimony is offered in court . . . .  In the vast majority of cases, the district
court first should decide whether the factors mentioned in Daubert are appropriate.
Once it considers the Daubert factors, the court then can consider whether other
factors, not mentioned in Daubert, are relevant to the case at hand.
Id.
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The beekeeper should be permitted to opine about the relationship between
wind direction and flight if he provides a rational processing answer to how he
knows that bees always take off into the wind.  That is, he must describe the
variables involved, the way in which he measures each variable, the number of
observations upon which he bases his judgment, and the way in which he con-
trols for confounding variables.  In practice, this is far less complex than it
sounds.  Imagine, at one extreme, that the beekeeper says that his opinion is
based on years of casual observations of an indeterminate number, and that his
view is reasonable because some other flying things, such as airplanes, generally
take off into the wind.  Such an opinion is experiential in nature.  It is holistic
(an overall general conclusion), associational (flying things generally take off
into the wind), and crudely differentiated (there is no measurement of wind
velocity).  Imagine, at the other extreme, that he reports that many years ago he
thought he had noticed a general tendency for bees to take off into the wind.
Thereafter, he went out of his way to see which way the bees took off in many
wind conditions.  He discovered that in completely calm air or when there was
almost no wind the bees took off in every direction, but as soon as the wind
picked up to five miles per hour or so they always seemed to take off in that di-
rection.  He even once or twice brought a portable fan to his hives to see if the
bees took off into the wind no matter from which direction it came.
The example could go on to make our beekeeper more and more of a ra-
tional system processor.  At some point, the court would simply stop the Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 104A hearing and permit the expert to testify to opinions
that fit the case.  A similar analysis would be appropriate for Judge McKenna’s
harbor pilot.289  If the question posed to the pilot is the location of a harbor
channel at any given time, and if harbor channels are anything like channels on
the Mississippi, the pilot could do far worse than Mr. Bixby’s detailed, rational
system-based instruction of Samuel Clemens.290  Even a casual reading of the
first half of Life on the Mississippi provides the reader with a detailed descrip-
tion of the variables that affect the location of channels.  Mr. Bixby’s instruction
does not end with a discussion of the variables that affect the river.  He also
provides the cub pilot with a long list of diagnostic tools one should employ in
making a differential diagnosis about the location of a passable channel at any
given moment.
Our trust in Mr. Bixby’s diagnoses is enhanced because they are tested daily
in the commercial marketplace.291  If his assessments of the location and depth
of the river channel suffered from a very high error rate, he would soon find
himself in the ranks of former pilots.  Several writers have argued that in such
cases, we should be more willing to trust experience  testimony because the real
world confirms or disconfirms the expert’s experiential judgment.  For example,
when discussing Judge McKenna’s comparison of handwriting expertise and
289. See United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1029 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
290. See MARK TWAIN, LIFE ON THE  MISSISSIPPI  (1917).
291. See Faigman et al., supra note 14, at 1804.
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harbor pilot expertise,292  Randolph N. Jonakait notes that “every time the pilot
ventures through the harbor he gets instantaneous feedback about his decisions.
He navigates successfully or he runs aground.  We can have high confidence
that he would have learned about mistakes if he committed them.”293  And
Faigman, Porter and Saks note that
unlike harbor pilots, practitioners of many purely forensic expertises, such as hand-
writing identification, commonly have no way of knowing whether they have come to
the right conclusions in their actual cases. They may know if a jury agreed with them,
but they usually have no way of checking to see if they were actually right or wrong,
and neither does anybody else.294
I do not disagree with these observations, but I would add that even when the
expert’s judgment has been tested on the job, it is still appropriate for the court
to ask the expert to address the question of error rates.  Experience in the world
is not a substitute for a rational process explanation of how one has reached an
expert judgment.  Most important, acquiring knowledge through experience
does not prevent an expert from providing a rational process foundation for
that knowledge.
Some might argue that the knowledge of pilots and beekeepers is different
because they cannot provide a full foundation for their testimony.  The Berry
court implied as much in its original beekeeper example: “In other words, the
beekeeper does not know any more about flight principles than the jurors, but
he has seen a lot more bumblebees than they have.”295  However, this criticism is
not unique to experience experts.  For example, the same frequently might be
said of epidemiologists.  They have well-designed studies that provide expert in-
formation as to whether a given substance causes a given injury.  But they do
not necessarily know any more about how the substance causes the injury than
the juror.  The epidemiological evidence that thalidomide caused birth defects
existed long before anyone had a clear understanding of how or why this oc-
curred.296  Even were such knowledge available to some other expert, it might
not be part of the expertise of an epidemiologist.  There are limits to every ex-
pert’s knowledge.
A more serious concern is that there are limits to every field of knowledge.
I agree that these limits must be taken into consideration when making admis-
sibility decisions.  Here, courts must strike a difficult balance.  In his article on
non-scientific expert testimony, Imwinkelried provides numerous examples of
292. See Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. at 1029.
293. Randolph N. Jonakait, The Assessment of Expertise: Transcending Construction, 37 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 301, 342 (1997).
294. 2 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF
EXPERT TESTIMONY 88 (1997).  For a general discussion of the problem of confirming experience-
based expertise when the market for the expert’s opinion is almost entirely the courtroom, see Faigman
et al., supra note 14.
295. Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1350 (6th Cir. 1994).
296. See Max Sherman & Steven Strauss, Thalidomide: A Twenty-Five Year Perspective, 41 FOOD
DRUG COSM. L.J. 458 (1986).
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non-scientific experts, including farmers, carpenters, and trapshooters.297  These
areas of expert knowledge vary from one another and from formal scientific
disciplines in terms of the formal methodological apparatus they have estab-
lished to assist them with the rational processing of information.  It would be
very inappropriate for a court to demand of a carpenter the same methodologi-
cal sophistication it would ask of a chemist.  Moreover, some questions permit
better data than others.  Experts who testify as to questions of specific causa-
tion, be they doctors testifying as to whether a specific substance caused an ill-
ness in this particular plaintiff, or engineers testifying as to the cause of a spe-
cific tire failure, typically have less information to work with than experts who
testify as to questions of general causation.
As these examples suggest, courts should not establish thresholds that make
the best the enemy of the good.  The “same intellectual rigor” test in Kumho re-
flects this idea.298  The Supreme Court clearly felt that the plaintiff’s expert’s
performance in that case fell below the standard of his field.299  Had his “intellec-
tual rigor” been found to be on par with his fellow engineers, his testimony
would have been less suspect.  In general, the threshold of admissibility in some
areas of knowledge will be higher than in others because more developed areas
have better measurement instruments, have more sophisticated methods, and
are better able to control for a greater variety of confounding variables that
threaten the expert’s hypothesis.
Even within fields, courts may raise the admissibility threshold as capabili-
ties advance.  For example, prior to the ability to measure the concentration of
alcohol in the bloodstream, driving while intoxicated was criminalized without a
precise definition of “intoxication.”300  As techniques to measure blood and
breath alcohol content emerged, the very definition of the offense changed to
driving with blood or breath alcohol levels exceeding specified minimums.301
Under such laws, testimony that once may have been adequate—for example,
testimony that the defendant looked like he was drunk and had the odor of al-
cohol on his breath—may no longer be admitted.  What is required is some type
of chemical, biochemical, or gas chromatographic test, as well as the testimony
of someone skilled in its use.302  The alcohol testing example reflects a desire on
the part of the courts to require better evidence as a field matures.  Similarly,
the same intellectual rigor test reflects a desire to obtain better evidence than
297. See Imwinkelried, supra note 226, at 2278.
298. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 153 (1999).
299. See id. at 157.
300. See Robert J. Schefter, Under the Influence of Alcohol Three Hours After Driving, 100 DICK. L.
REV. 441, 444 (1996) (noting that Pennsylvania passed its first DUI statute in 1909, prohibiting opera-
tion of a motor vehicle while intoxicated even without a precise definition of intoxication).
301. See id.
302. See ANDRE A. MOENSSENS ET AL., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES
212, 220 (4th ed. 1995).
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the expert is offering when that evidence becomes available.303  Often, the ex-
pert could offer a more rational, less experiential analysis but has not done so.
Some situations may exist where the proffered testimony is so unreliable
that the party cannot prevail, yet better evidence is not readily available.304  It
may even be that this failure is not because the expert has failed to employ the
same intellectual rigor of those in her field.  Nevertheless, exclusion may be in
order.  The same intellectual rigor test may often be a necessary requirement,
but it is not sufficient.  As is true with the general acceptance test, meeting the
intellectual rigor standard does not ensure admissibility.  When an expert’s tes-
timony is insufficiently rational in the sense I have used the term in this article,
it is appropriately inadmissible.
In my judgment, the courts are already moving toward the approach I have
outlined here.  For example, in Willert v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,305 plaintiff
claimed her autoimmune hemolytic anemia and Guillain-Barre Syndrome were
caused by the antimicrobial medication Floxin that she took for bronchitis.306
Judge Rosenbaum excluded the plaintiff’s expert testimony, which was based
entirely on anecdotal case reports mentioned in the medical literature and the
temporal proximity between the Floxin prescription and the onset of the plain-
tiff’s ailments.307  With respect to the first of these two bases, the court noted
that because case reports simply describe phenomena without comparison to
the rate at which they occur in the general population, they do not exclude
other causes.308  The analysis appears to make connections through association
rather than logical considerations, an attribute of experiential processing.309  As
to the second basis of the expert’s opinion, the court concluded that
“[u]ltimately, the theory devolves into the thesis that because ‘B’ came after
‘A,’ ‘A’ caused ‘B.’”310  From the point of view of this paper, the central problem
with both bases of the expert opinion is that they appear to be grounded, to a
large degree, on experiential processing.  Willert comes close to making this
point directly when it quotes the Eighth Circuit in Sorensen v. Shaklee Corp.311
303. See Faigman et al., supra note 152.
304. To use a toxic tort example, “structure-activity” evidence can suggest that a substance causes
an injury:  The substance to which the plaintiff was exposed has a certain chemical structure, and other
substances with similar structures are known to cause similar injuries.  If we assume that this is the only
evidence connecting exposure to injury, most courts would hold that the evidence is insufficient to sup-
port a plaintiff’s verdict. This should not mean, however, that the court must allow the plaintiff to put
on her case and then rule the evidence is insufficient in response to a motion for a directed verdict. The
court can properly rule that there is an inadequate fit between this data and an expert’s conclusion that
the substance causes an injury and that it is not scientifically sound for an expert to rely solely on struc-
ture-activity evidence to draw a causal conclusion.  The failure to present a better variety of testimony
is fatal in this situation, even though better evidence does not currently exist.
305. 995 F. Supp. 979 (D. Minn. 1998).
306. See id. at 981.
307. See id.
308. See id. (quoting Casey v. Ohio Med. Prods., 877 F. Supp. 1380, 1385 (N.D. Cal. 1995)).
309. See Epstein, supra note 170, at 470.
310. Willert, 995 F. Supp. at 982.
311. 31 F.3d 638, 649 (8th Cir. 1994).
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concerning a temporally based theory of causation:  “Instead of reasoning from
known facts to reach a conclusion, the expert[] . . .  reasoned from an end result
in order to hypothesize what needed to be known but what was not.”312  An out-
come focus rather than a process focus is another indicator of experiential rea-
soning.313
Jaurequi v. Carter Manufacturing Co., Inc.314 offers another recent example.
There, the court said the following of plaintiff’s engineer in a products liability
design defect case:
In the case at hand, Willis was prepared to testify that the corn head was unrea-
sonably dangerous because it lacked awareness barriers.  However, Willis has not at-
tempted to construct or even draw the suggested device, much less test its utility as a
safety device or its compatibility with the corn head’s proper function . . . . We there-
fore hold that the district court did not abuse its broad discretion in concluding that
the proffered testimony regarding the lack of awareness barriers flunked the reliability
prong of  Daubert  . . . .315
From the perspective of this paper, one could say that what was wrong with the
expert’s testimony was that it was too holistic, associational, and subjective.316  It
looked at a single facet of the product and a single outcome without examining
the many other variables that may play a role in deciding whether this was a su-
perior alternative feasible design.
The proposed revision to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 supports this
course.317  The Rule declares testimony to be admissible provided that “the tes-
timony is the product of reliable principles and methods.”318  The epistemologi-
cal needs of courts, such as the nature of the adversarial process and the limita-
tions of juries and judges, suggest that the methods in question should involve
rational processing.
312. Id. at 649.
313. See Epstein et al., Irrational Reactions, supra note 165, at 329.
314. 173 F.3d 1076 (8th Cir. 1999).
315. Id. at 1083–84.
316. See supra text accompanying note 171.
317. Absent intervention by the Supreme Court or the Congress, the revised rule will read as fol-
lows:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of opinion or other-
wise, if (1) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of
reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods
reliably to the facts of the case.
H.R. Doc. No. 106-225, at 9 (2000) (revision underlined).
    The stated purpose of the drafters of the new rule is to have its language reflect the recent Supreme
Court decisions on admissibility.  See Committee notes (visited on Oct. 1, 2000) <http://www.uscourts.
gov/review.html>.
318. Id.
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V
CONCLUSION
Courts and commentators have wrestled with how we should assess the ad-
missibility of non-scientific expert evidence.  This issue has been brought to the
fore by the Supreme Court’s 1999 opinion in Kumho Tire v. Carmichael.  The
court held that, to be admissible, both scientific and non-scientific evidence
must be reliable.  However, the Court provided few guidelines as to how trial
courts should go about the business of assessing reliability in non-scientific ar-
eas.  In part, this is because of the seemingly infinite variety of  “technical and
other specialized knowledge” contemplated by Federal Rule of Evidence 702.
In this article, I have argued that although there are disciplinary differences
in the way experts attempt to know things, there is also great overlap.  The “ex-
perience based knowledge” of such people as beekeepers and harbor pilots is
not per se different from scientific knowledge.  Borrowing from a body of psy-
chological literature on how people process information, I argue that the more
fundamental distinction is between rational and experiential processing of in-
formation.
The courts could attempt to craft admissibility rules that reflect these differ-
ent ways of knowing something.  I believe, however, that this would be a mis-
take.  The law’s own epistemological needs argue for a strong preference for ra-
tional processing, meaning that Daubert’s focus on methodology in the area of
scientific expertise should be maintained for non-scientific expertise.
I must confess that the precise outlines of the approach to admissibility ar-
gued for here are not sharply defined either in this article or in my own mind.  It
will take some time to understand exactly what this approach means for par-
ticular areas of expertise and to recognize whether there remain some pockets
of valuable expertise that cannot be placed within this framework.  However, I
do take solace in the fact that working such things out is the special genius of
judge-made law.
